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Leviathan
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The Impact of State
Capacity on the
Duration & Intensity
of Civil Wars
Sarah Simon
University of Pennsylvania
“For by Art is created that great Leviathan called
a Commonwealth or State, which is but an artificial Man; though of greater stature and strength
than the Natural, for whose protection and defence
it was intended … [without the State] there is continual fear, and the danger of violent death; and life
of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”
– Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651)
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N

o one is in control� It is very frightening� Power is in the streets, and
it belongs to those with a gun,”
said a businessman to a journalist from the
Associated Press in 1997� In his country,
an ongoing civil war had spurred travel bans from the capital, leading many to
book plane tickets under false names, and a
sense of dread had fallen over the city� Another citizen echoed his sentiments, telling
another journalist how the gunmen had
killed his brother: “My mother Florence
heard the shots from the house, and she
always remembered how she saw two men
running away cheering” (O’Boyle, 2017)�
He went on to describe how the targeting
of his brother in the civil war later de-

Abstract
While wars between nations have declined
over the past twenty years, intrastate conflicts are on the rise�, leading scholars to
examine the conditions under which civil
war is likely to break out, to last longer,
and to intensify� The strength of the local
government has emerged as a critical factor
that could potentially mitigate the harms
posed by civil wars� This thesis addresses
two research questions: what is the impact of
state strength on (1) conflict duration and (2)
conflict intensity? To answer these research
questions, I conduct several quantitative analyses of all internal conflicts occurring in the
years 1960-2015, examining the relationship
between state strength and conflict duration
and battle deaths per year� This thesis ultimately finds that state strength, as proxied by
military, fiscal, and bureaucratic capacities, is
negatively correlated with conflict intensity
but is positively correlated with conflict duration� This thesis concludes with the presentation of two case studies – the First Congo
War and the Troubles of Northern Ireland
– to illustrate how strong states may experience longer, but less bloody, civil wars�

stroyed their mother, remarking, “There’s
no doubt in my mind it was brought on the
stress of what happened�”
Despite the similarity of their situations, these two citizens were describing
lawlessness and violence in two separate
civil wars on two different continents� The
businessman, Robert Mulamba, spoke to
reporters in what was then known as Zaire,
known today as the Democratic Republic
of the Congo� As Mulamba grimly awaited
gunmen in the anarchic streets of Kinshasa, the civil war in which Ken Funston’s
brother was gunned down was drawing to
a close after decades of violence� Funston
lived in County Fermanagh in Northern
Ireland, which since 1969 had been rocked
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by sectarian violence in which over 3,000
people, Funston’s brother among them,
would ultimately die� Despite their dramatically different life circumstances, both
Mulamba and Funston found themselves
subjected to and terrorized by capricious
and random violence� Despite their dramatically different countries, both Mulamba and Funston regarded the rebels with a
mixture of hostility and fear� And despite
the dramatically different levels of political development in their countries, both
Mulamba and Funston found themselves
in the middle of a conf lict spurred by massive grievances against the state� Grievances against governments are pervasive
and eternal� But what makes Mulamba and
Funston’s circumstances unique is these
grievances boiled over in the form of civil
war�
As Mulamba’s and Funston’s stories
should illustrate, civil wars demonstrate
remarkable variation in their outbreak,
violence, combatants, length, and intensity� The shortest civil wars end within
minutes after the staging of a bloody coup
d’état, while some internal conf licts last
decades – the Sudanese Civil War began
in August 1955 and is still being fought
to this day, sixty-one years later� Meanwhile, some civil wars have seen the death
of millions, while some civil wars kill two
dozen people per year and are punctuated by long lulls in the violence� Some civil
wars are fought between two clearly-defined armies in pitched battles with clear
frontlines, while other civil wars entail
years of guerilla warfare between a strong
state and a rebel group barely clinging to
survival� But Mulamba’s and Funston’s
stories also show that, regardless of their
intensity or length, one thing is certain
about civil wars, and that is the tremendous toll they take on local populations
and economies� Civil wars victimize sol-

diers and civilians alike, and those that
do not die directly from violence are often
harmed by the subsequent failure of institutions, threats to public health, and collapse of the local economy (Imai & Weinstein, 2000)� Moreover, civil wars are on
the rise: a third of all nations since 1960
have experienced internal conf lict of some
sort, and intrastate wars have occurred far
more frequently than have interstate wars
over the past seventy years (Blattman &
Miguel, 2010; Dosse, 2010)�
In recent years, the civil war literature
has turned away from analyzing the desire to engage in civil war (namely a focus
on economic greed or political grievance)
towards an opportunity-based model of
civil war outbreak� This model focuses
on the political opportunity structure in
place that informs potential rebels’ decision to wage civil war, and at its center is
a discussion of state capacity (Tilly, 1978)�
Scholars are now examining the conditions under which civil war is likely to
break out, to last longer, and to intensify,
and the strength of the local government
has emerged as a critical factor that could
potentially mitigate the harms posed by
civil wars� Underlying this scholarship is
the hope that states can protect their citizens from violence within their own borders, and the ability of the state to ameliorate the natural conditions of anarchy has
been a centerpiece of political theory from
the 1600s onwards� While much attention has been paid to the ability of states
to forestall civil war onset, more research
is needed regarding how state strength
and legitimacy can change the character
and dynamics of civil wars once they occur� This thesis hopes to fill this gap in
the literature by addressing the two following research questions: why are some
civil wars more intense than others, and
why do some civil wars last longer than
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others? These questions have importance
because they examine the qualities and
characteristics of civil wars under various
conditions of state strength, leading to a
greater understanding of the opportunity structures rebels face when fighting
against a government� These questions
also have significance for peacekeepers in
generating policy prescriptions for predicting, forestalling, and resolving intrastate conf lict�
This thesis will advance hypotheses regarding the extent to which state capacity
impacts the intensity and length of civil
war and ultimately argues that military,
fiscal, and bureaucratic capacity are essential components of state capacity� Using
these proxies for state capacity, I will show
that state strength is negatively correlated
with conf lict intensity but positively associated with civil war intensity� In addition
to my statistical analyses, this thesis provides two case studies to illustrate how
state capacity may lengthen civil wars
but attenuate their intensity: first, Robert
Mulamba’s war of First Congo War, and
second, Ken Funston’s war of the Troubles
in Northern Ireland� In the First Congo
War, the dissolution of the Zairian state,
coupled with fallout from the Rwandan
genocide, allowed rebels to quickly unseat the Mobutu regime, with thousands
of battle deaths and tens of thousands of
civilian deaths occurring in only a few
months of conf lict� On the other hand, in
the Troubles in Northern Ireland, one of
the strongest states in the world underestimated the severity of grievances held by
citizens of one of its peripheral provinces
and struggled to strike an appropriate balance between the use of military and political strategies, leading to a low-intensity
conf lict of nearly thirty years�
In the following section, I outline

the existing literature regarding state
strength, intensity of conf lict, and length
of conf lict, using the existing scholarship to later inform my decisions of how
to operationalize state capacity� Following
this, I advance a theory of how three major components of state capacity (military
strength, government revenues, and bureaucratic quality) inf luence duration and
intensity of conf lict� After this, I outline
my data and methodology for my quantitative and qualitative analyses� I then present
the findings of my quantitative analyses
of all internal conf licts occurring in the
years 1960 – 2015� This thesis finds that
state strength is positively correlated with
duration of civil war; that is, the stronger
a state, the longer civil war within its borders is likely to endure� In addition, this
thesis finds that state capacity is statistically significantly and negatively correlated with battle deaths occurring in a civil
war, meaning that stronger states tend to
experience lower-intensity conf licts� To illustrate the potential mechanisms leading
to these relationships, I then provide the
two case studies of the First Congo War
and the Troubles of Northern Ireland� The
final section concludes with implications
of the findings and questions for further
research�

Literature Review

I

ntrastate wars have occurred far more
frequently in recent years than inter-state wars and tend to endure longer, and their effects range from extreme
loss of human life to economic damage
(Fearon, 2004; Themnér & Wallensteen,
2013)� Because of the massive harms posed
by civil wars, scholars have sought to identify specific ways in which the effects of
civil wars persist and impact the population� To begin with, civil wars kill both
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on and off the battlefield: nearly as many
people are indirectly killed by civil wars
through damaged infrastructure and increased spread of disease as are killed in
battle (Ghobarah, 2003)� Moreover, civil
wars destroy national education systems,
inf licting damage that persists for generations, and also cause f light of human
and physical capital (Chamarbagwala &
Moran, 2011; Collier, 1999; Lai & Thyne,
2007)� Further, countries take years to
recover and develop after civil wars, and
civil war-torn states unsurprisingly experience reduced international trade (Bayer & Rupert, 2004; Flores & Nooruddin,
2009)� Post-conflict countries tend to receive less foreign direct investment and
development aid, and countries that border post-conf lict countries see reduced
economic growth (Garriga & Phillips,
2014; Murdoch & Sandler, 2004)� While
the literature regarding the impacts of
civil wars is well-developed, not as much
research has been conducted on factors
impacting conf lict duration and intensity�
This is a critical area of research because
when civil wars break out, external countries and multilateral organizations often
attempt to reduce the harms posed by the
war, and loss of life is a primary way that
intrastate war threatens future stability�
Thus, the scholarship should attempt to
address factors that lead to higher losses
of life, along with longer civil wars� This
literature review will begin by analyzing
the existing literature about state capacity and then turn to an examination of the
literature regarding conf lict duration and
intensity�

State Capacity
At first blush, states avoid violent challenges to their authority through multiple methods, including three strategies
that Fjelde and De Soysa (2009) identify

as coercion, co-optation, and cooperation
with potential internal adversaries� States
can help keep the civil peace and stop civil
war outbreak through high levels of government spending on political goods and
the establishment of trustworthy institutions (Fjelde & De Soysa, 2009)� But when
states cannot keep control and descend
into civil war, Collier, Hoeff ler, and Soderbom (2004) note that a state’s lack of economic and military capacity can lengthen
the duration of a civil war� Moreover, escalation of civil war can lead to an increase
in military spending in the warring country itself and in neighboring countries, requiring more demands on state fiscal capacity (Phillips, 2015)� On the other hand,
state capacity – as measured by military
quality and gross domestic product – has
been shown not to be associated with intensity of civil war conf lict (Lacina, 2006)�
However, it is not immediately clear what
impact other measures of state capacity
have on conf lict intensity� Much of the literature focuses on defining state capacity,
state capacity’s impact on internal development, how state capacity can forestall
civil war onset, and how state capacity can
aid the resolution of civil wars�
State capacity is a crucial and difficult concept to define and operationalize�
Kocher (2010) criticizes the use of the term
“state capacity,” noting, “You might inquire about my capacity to solve equations
or shoot jump-shots, but it would not make
much sense to inquire about my capacity
in general�” Kocher (2010) insists that first
researchers must identify what type of capacity states must have and the objectives
for which that capacity is useful� Some major theoretical measures of state capacity
include military power and capacity, bureaucratic and administrative capacity, fiscal capabilities, and quality and coherence
of political institutions (Hendrix, 2010)�
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Various ways to operationalize military
capacity abound, namely military personnel per capita (Diehl, 1983; Jones, Bremer
& Singer, 1996; Mason & Fett, 1996; Wayman, Singer & Goertz, 1983), log military
spending per capita (Henderson & Singer,
2000), and log GDP per capita (Fearon &
Laitin, 2003)� In addition, two major ways
to operationalize bureaucratic or administrative capacity include expert assessments of bureaucratic quality and rule of
law, along with export profiles, natural resources, and extractive capacity (Hendrix,
2010)� Further, the quality and coherence
of political institutions is usually identified
as a critical factor providing state capacity
(Gurr, 1974; Hegre et al�, 2001)� However,
Hanson and Sigman (2013) go further and
identify other measures of state capacity,
like control of tax evasion, implementation
of government decisions, and maintaining
the monopoly on violence as important elements of state capacity� Moreover, various
theorized dimensions of state capacity can
be difficult to disentangle from one another, making it tricky for researchers to
identify which measures of state capacity
are significant (Hanson & Sigman, 2013;
Cingolani, 2013)�
Setting aside questions of how to define
state capacity, the literature has examined
the impact of state capacity on general economic development and national security�
Besley and Persson (2010) contend that
a lack of state capacity, as manifested in
weak or failed states, is a major obstacle to
development, and indicators of state weakness all have negative impact on fidelity
to human rights, leading weak states to
have worse human rights records on average than strong ones (Englehart, 2009)�
Lack of state capacity can lead to security concerns as well: a low legal capacity
can contribute to the likelihood of internal violence, and failed states are similarly

more prone to produce terrorists (Besley
& Persson, 2010; Rotberg, 2002)� In addition, state capacity may provide protection
from regional contagion, as state capacity
has been shown to decrease the likelihood
that a state will become infected by civil
conf lict occurring in neighboring territories (Braithwaite, 2010)�
As a result, a wealth of literature points
to state capacity as a fundamental factor
of civil war onset; in conditions of civil
war, the internal security of the state is
no longer assured, and the natural security dilemma that states exist to prevent is
exacerbated (Posen, 1993)� Hendrix (2011)
identifies a negative and significant correlation between civil war onset and fiscal
capacity as measured by tax revenue, and
other research notes that controlling for
measures of state capacity reveals a strong
negative correlation between democratization of a country and likelihood of civil conf lict (Gleditsch & Ruggeri, 2010)�
Goodwin and Skocpol (1989) argue that
democratization, bureaucratic effectiveness, and size of government army should
prevent the outbreak of civil war since the
government is more capable of holding
the state together� Democratization may
prevent the outbreak of civil war because
they produce fewer radicalized elements
and provide less exclusionary outlets for
the resolution of ethnic conf lict (Gvosdev
& Gurr, 2000)� Relatedly, an effective bureaucracy is capable of policing rural areas
and providing services that make citizens
less inclined to rebel, which may decrease
the likelihood of civil war onset (Fearon &
Laitin, 2003)� However, scholars disagree
on the extent to which strong state capacity decreases risk of war onset� Sobek
(2010) argues that strong states have a
decreased risk of experiencing civil war,
while Thies (2010) claims that state capacity does not affect civil war onset� How-
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ever, both Sobek (2010) and Thies (2010)
note that civil war onset may reduce state
capacity, implying a potential reverse causality� Besley and Persson (2008) back up
this assertion, finding that the prospect of
an external war spurs much more investment and development of fiscal capacity
than does the prospect of a civil war�
Finally, state capacity may also be an
important characteristic that can contribute to the resolution of civil wars� Capable
states that experience civil violence might
be more able to credibly commit to a treaty or negotiation, which increases the likelihood the violence can reach a bargained
conclusion (McBride, Milante, & Skaperdas, 2011; Sobek, 2010)� Other measures
of state capacity, like bureaucratic effectiveness and quality of military, may be
linked to the outcome of civil wars� An
effective state bureaucracy represents the
ability of a government to function even
in times of regime stress, and correspondingly, bureaucratic quality should make it
more likely the government wins a civil
war (Goodwin & Skocpol, 1989; Knack,
2001; Schock, 1996)� Similarly, a strong
government army may be able to forestall
losses of territory to rebel groups, making
it harder for rebels to win (Balch-Lindsay
& Enterline, 2000)� On the other hand,
Lacina (2006) finds that quality of military is not strongly correlated with severity of civil war� DeRouen and Sobek (2004)
also find that size of army alone might not
necessarily increase the likelihood of victory, indicating that nonmilitary aspects
of state capacity are important as well�
However, DeRouen and Sobek note that,
while state capacity is necessary for peace
agreements, it might not be sufficient conditions for a sustainable civil peace�
Overall, while the impact of state capacity on civil war onset and resolution

has been well-documented, the impact
that state capacity can have while civil
wars are ongoing is not as clear� This is
a vital question; while state capacity can
be an important bulwark against civil war
outbreak, the literature generally fails to
address what happens when “all else fails”
and strong states do experience internal
conf lict� Moreover, the literature lacks
agreement on how to define state capacity
and how to operationalize it in the context
of civil wars, and policymakers and peacekeepers may want answers to the question
of “what tools or resources may be useful
to states when fighting a civil war?” Later,
this thesis will seek to address these gaps
in the literature by proposing a theory of
state capacity and how it impacts duration
and intensity of conf lict�

Conf lict Duration
Another major question scholars have
asked about civil wars centers around the
determinants of the duration of civil conf lict� Grievances and ethnic conf lict may
be linked to length of conf lict (Collier,
Hoeff ler, & Söderbom, 2004)� Collier et
al� (2004) provide three key conceptualizations of civil war: rebellion-as-investment
(in which the critical incentive for fighting is the payoff to rebels once war ends),
rebellion-as-mistake (in which military
optimism prevents the recognition of any
mutually advantageous settlement), and
rebellion-as-business (in which the rebellion pays off through income or satisfaction while fighting occurs)� Collier et al�
(2004) find that the key factors that lengthen conf lict are low per capita income,
high inequality, and a moderate degree
of ethnic division, indicating that rebellion-as-mistake and rebellion-as-business
are better conceptualizations of civil war
– that is, “rebellions will occur where and
only where they are profitable” since the
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opportunity costs of civil wars must be
low in order for them to occur� Ethnic rebellions or rebellions motivated by grievance tend to be long in duration, especially
“sons of the soil” wars that pit a peripheral ethnic minority against state-supported migrants of a dominant ethnic group
(Fearon, 2004)� Wucherpfenning, Mettermich, Cederman, and Gleditsch (2012)
find that ethnicity per se does not matter
as much as how government and nonstate
leaders capitalize on it, finding that rebels’ ethnic linkage to an excluded makes
conf lict endure longer� On the other hand,
other scholars find that ethnic fractionalization makes conf licts shorter (Cunningham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2009)�
Another proposed factor in the duration of civil wars are the presence of natural resources in the country experiencing
conf lict� Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala (2009)
find that fighting in regions with valuable
minerals – namely, petroleum, gemstones,
and drugs – lasts substantially longer
than fighting in regions without those
natural resources present� Other scholars confirm this finding, possibly since
it may make rebellion as a business more
profitable (Fearon, 2004; Wucherpfennig
et al�, 2012)� On this note, alluvial diamonds and illegal drugs may be the most
strongly linked to duration of civil war,
since they are considered “lootable” and
more easily capitalized on by rebels (Ross,
2003)� Lootable resources like diamonds
and drugs make non-separatist conf licts
endure longer but pose little danger in
separatist conf licts; on the other hand, unlootable resources like hydrocarbons tend
to spur separatist conf licts (Ross, 2003)�
Other characteristics of a country, in addition to its abundance of natural resources, like its democratization and population
size have been found to lengthen conf lict
(Cunningham et al�, 2009)�

Other characteristics of the civil war
itself – such as its ultimate outcome and
the goals and structure of its rebels – may
inf luence its duration� Fearon (2004) finds
that civil wars emerging from coup d’états
or revolutions tend to be shorter, as do civil
wars in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union states� Cunningham et al� (2009)
confirm that civil wars resulting from
coups are shorter on average� In addition,
governments that face rebels motivated by
secessionist goals take longer to prevail
(Brandt, 2008)� The duration of civil wars
may also be a function of whether it ends
in government victory, rebel victory, or a
negotiated settlement, since the baseline
hazard rates vary from outcome to outcome (Brandt, 2008)� On the rebels’ side,
Cunningham (2006) finds that the presence of multiple rebel organizations in the
same conf lict leads to narrower bargaining ranges, higher risk of info asymmetries, last mover advantages, and shifting
alliances� Therefore, the number of active
rebel organizations at the start of the conf lict should cause wars to endure longer�
Subsequent research has confirmed this
“veto players” hypothesis (Cunningham et
al�, 2009)�
Not only does the number of rebel
groups impact the duration of civil war,
but the strength of those groups may
also matter� Kalyvas and Balcells (2014)
propose three types of civil warfare: (1)
conventional warfare, which consists of
pitched battles and clear frontlines; (2) irregular warfare, which consists of a conventional state army versus lightly armed
guerillas; and (3) symmetric nonconventional (SNC) warfare, which consists of
a government and rebels matched at low
levels of military sophistication� They find
that irregular conf licts tend to last longer
than other conf licts, meaning that the
relative military capacities of states and
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rebels matter for the duration of civil war�
Absolute rebel and government strength
may be a critical factor as well, since rebel
strength – as measured by a high mobilization, arms-procurement, and fighting
capacity and a legal political wing – have
been found to make conf licts shorter
(Cunningham et al�, 2009)� On the other
side of the equation, some argue that, at
minimum, state capacity should increase
the length of time it takes for insurgents
to win (Mason, Fett, & Weingarten, 1999)�
However, the literature on conf lict duration has not fully examined the correlation
between state capacity and length of civil
war� When it has addressed this relationship, the measures of state capacity may be
f lawed� For example, DeRouen and Sobek
(2004) proxy state capacity with how democratic the country is, which does not
seem to be a fair assessment of a country’s
strength� Severely authoritarian or repressive regimes may have high state capacity,
insofar as they can accomplish and achieve
the objectives they set, while some countries may be nominally democratic but
lack solid institutions or bureaucracies�

Conf lict Intensity
The research regarding conf lict intensity proposes several variables that might
lead to higher conf lict intensity� Some
studies show that intensity of conf lict is
significantly correlated with the degree of
income inequality and wealth inequality,
indicating that severity of grievance held
by rebels might lead to more intense wars
(Murshed & Gates, 2005)� Lu and Thies
(2011) corroborate this assertion, finding
that the Gini index of a country is statistically significantly correlated with battle
deaths in civil wars� Ethnic fractionalization, another main grievance cited by the
literature, has been shown to be correlated with severity of conflict (Balcells &

Kalyvas, 2014; Lu & Thies, 2011; Lujala,
2009)� Relatedly, scholars have linked ethnic dominance and ethnic polarization to
greater battle deaths in civil wars (Lacina,
2006; Lu & Thies, 2011)�
Other characteristics of the country experiencing internal conf lict may contribute to the intensity of civil wars� Lujala
(2009) shows that natural resources, such
as the presence of gemstones, hydrocarbons, and drugs within regions experiencing conf lict, increase the number of battle
deaths� Importantly, Lujala (2009) finds
that nationwide aggregates of presence of
natural resources do not retain this predictive power; hydrocarbons and gemstones
must be present in the areas of fighting
in order to correlate with battle deaths�
Other scholars find that whether or not a
nation is a major oil exporter is a strong
predictor of how intense its civil war will
be (Balcells & Kalyvas, 2014)� Another
geographic factor increasing severity of
civil war is how rough or mountainous the
terrain is, which may allow rebels to find
shelter and regroup (Balcells & Kalyvas,
2014)� In terms of state activities, Wellendor (2013) shows that education spending
and male secondary school enrollment
have a pacifying effect on civil war intensity, while others contend that democratic institutions can also reduce fatalities
during civil wars (Lacina, 2006)� Lujala
(2009) confirms the finding that countries
that were considered to be democracies a
year before the conf lict started seem to
experience conf licts with fewer battle-related deaths� Finally, countries with larger
populations seem to experience more severe conf licts (Lujala, 2009)�
In addition, some research shows that
characteristics of the conf lict itself, such
as the method of warfare or foreign intervention, can affect how intense the conf lict
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will become� Kalyvas and Balcells (2014)
find that conventional wars – those consisting of two armies fighting pitched battles with clear frontlines – are most likely to have high amounts of battle deaths,
while SNC wars tend to be less intense� In
addition, scholars have found a strong correlation between external support for the
warring parties and intensity of conf lict
(Kalyvas & Balcells, 2014; Lacina, 2006;
Lujala, 2009)� However, Gleditsch (2007)
notes that civil wars that attract foreign
intervention are typically more intense
to begin with, but other studies control
for previous conf lict intensity levels and
conclude that various types of interventions can impact civil war intensity, finding that military interventions often lead
to more intense conf licts (Craig-Morse,
2013; Sousa, 2014)� As a result, civil violence during the Cold War was significantly more deadly than thereafter (Lacina, 2006; Lujala, 2009)� As put by Lu and
Thies (2011), “[s]pecifically, the USA and
USSR through their many interventions
nearly tripled the number of battle-related
deaths in a civil conf lict during the Cold
War period” (p� 226)�
Overall, civil war intensity can have
far-reaching consequences on the region,
such as increasing numbers of refugees
and enhancing neighborhood spillover effects and collateral damage (Murdoch &
Sandler, 2002; Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo,
1989), making the study of its correlates
vitally important� However, while the literature has indirectly addressed the impact of state capacity through discussion
of technologies of warfare (namely, Kalyvas and Balcells, 2014), scholars have generally not examined this characteristic
that is present in all civil wars – the state
and its capacity to fight a civil war� Some
qualities of countries, such as oil exportation, rough terrain, and democratization,

have been shown to affect civil war intensity, but most of these characteristics of
nation-states are immutable and not subject to change over a short period of time�
State capacity, on the other hand, may be
manipulable by foreign countries or peacekeeping organizations through grants or
provision of arms� If state capacity is associated with more or fewer battle deaths in
a conf lict, it may be worth examining for
policymakers seeking to reduce intensity
of civil wars� With that in mind, this thesis will now advance a definition of state
capacity and present a theory of how state
capacity impacts conf lict duration and intensity�

Theory

T

his thesis advances the following
definition of state capacity: the
ability of a state to set and achieve
various policy objectives� This definition
consists of two components: (1) the setting of policy and (2) the implementation
of policy� The first component requires
states to be able to coordinate and set policy goals and objectives; intrinsic in this
requirement is the necessity that governments possess a leadership structure that
can decide the policy objective� Second,
this definition of state capacity necessitates that governments must be able to
implement policies to achieve the selected
objective; in order to do this, states must
coordinate amongst various bureaucracies
once the objectives are set and use available tools and resources to complete the
objective� I contend that a state possesses
state capacity when it can accomplish both
aspects of this definition�
Because there are different objectives at
different times for different governments,
state capacity might not always refer to
the same capabilities; put more specifical-
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ly, different types of capacities will matter for the policy objective selected by the
government� For example, the objective of
protecting citizens from foreign invasion
requires different tools, resources, and
abilities than does the objective of providing housing to citizens� For the first
objective, military capacity will be an important factor – how strong is the state’s
military, and how able is it to stop invaders? But for the latter objective, fiscal capacity might be more important — how
much money does the government have,
and can it provide goods to its citizens?
In these examples, we more clearly see the
definition of state capacity because the policy objective is identified, along with the
skills, resources, and tools a government
needs to achieve the objective� The definition of state capacity that I advance in this
thesis addresses Kocher’s (2010) concerns
that “state capacity” does not hold water
as a general concept� Kocher (2010) insists
that researchers must identify what type
of capacity states must have and the objectives for which that capacity is useful� I
agree in part, contending that in order to
talk about state capacity, researchers must
specify the policy objective the government seeks to achieve and whether or not
the state has the capability to achieve it�
However, my proposed definition departs
from Kocher’s by noting that state capacity can cut across policy areas and that we
can conceptualize the notion of a “strong
state” more broadly� Under this proposed
definition, a strong state is that which can
set policy goals and has a variety of effective tools, resources, and skills for achieving those goals� Strong states have a broad
repertoire of abilities and can direct their
resources to achieving their set objectives�
Turning to an examination of civil wars,
let us brief ly set aside the first component
of the theory – that states must be able to

determine and set their policy goals – and
hypothesize what the objectives of states
might be when engaged in civil war� To
be sure, various states will set different
goals, depending on the disposition of the
top leadership, the history of the country,
and the strength of the insurgency, but
this thesis contends that governments are
concerned with two primary objectives
during civil war: (1) maintaining the stability of their regime, and (2) ending the
civil war� These two objectives are necessary for governments to achieve but may
not be sufficient in and of themselves; the
leadership might set other goals, depending on the exact nature of the conf lict, but
they must achieve these two objectives at
minimum in order to maintain control�
This section now turns to an analysis of
these two state objectives�
First, this thesis contends that states
are concerned with the stability and safety of their own regime during a civil war�
This is one of their primary objectives
during a civil war because the leadership
of the state may be harmed or killed if
their regime’s stability is not assured� In
the case of internal conf lict, the leaders
of the regime seek to ensure that violence
is not used against them; thus, the leaders of states are concerned with the stability of their regime and with their own
physical safety during periods of civil war�
Second, this thesis contends that states are
also concerned with winning the civil war
when war breaks out within their borders�
In many ways, winning the civil war is an
ancillary goal that arises due to concerns
of regime stability, and states might be
content to allow civil wars to endure, if
they don’t cause too much trouble or if it
allows the government leaders to consolidate their regime� So perhaps some states
do not prioritize winning the civil war�
With that noted, there are unique reasons
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that states are concerned with ending civil wars� For example, governments might
fear losing natural resources or economic damage after a prolonged civil war; in
addition, governments might fear interference or manipulation by foreign governments or multinational organizations
like the United Nations if the conditions
of anarchy persist for too long� Moreover,
states focus on ending civil wars because
they need to retain the sole legitimate use
of violence within their borders� Weber
(1968) proposes that governments become
sovereign when they have a monopoly on
the legitimate use of force in a given territory� In the case of civil war, rebel groups
intrinsically challenge this monopoly on
violence within the nation’s borders, thus
challenging the state’s sovereignty as
well� Indeed, in many cases, governments
are fighting rebel groups who seek to become the new government and to possess
that monopoly on violence� Thus, because
states seek to retain the legitimacy of their
regimes, states are concerned with ending
civil war when it breaks out in their borders�
Therefore, if we accept that these are
the two primary objectives of states
during civil wars, an analysis of state capacity must take into account what tools
and resources are necessary for achieving
these two objectives� For the first objective of maintaining the stability of the regime, a strong military can help maintain
physical safety of leaders and ensure that
the governmental structure remains safe
and intact� Thus, an important measure of
state capacity should be the military capacity a state possesses� For the second
objective – ending the civil war – a variety of capabilities are useful� They include,
but are not limited to, a military strong
enough to defeat the insurgency, a bureaucracy capable of negotiation and coordina-

tion of action after a settlement has been
reached, and fiscal resources to maintain
its military and to provide material benefits to citizens to remove incentives to join
the rebel group(s)� A professional and autonomous bureaucracy, including military
officer corps, can allow the state to act in
more coordinated fashion and decrease
the likelihood of fractionalization and
neo-patrimonialism in the officer corps�
Moreover, bureaucratic quality is a critical component of the first part of the proposed theory of state capacity; without a
strong bureaucracy and leadership, states
might not even be able to set policy objectives in the first place� Thus, the following
capabilities emerge as critical elements of
state capacity when considering the policy
objectives of states during civil wars: (1)
military capacity, (2) fiscal capacity, and
(3) bureaucratic capacity�
Now that we have adequately defined
the key components of state capacity for
the identified policy objectives, I now seek
to answer the research questions posed by
advancing hypotheses of how these three
key elements of state capacity inf luence
the duration and intensity of conf lict�

State Capacity & Duration
First, I hypothesize that state capacity
should increase the duration of civil wars
because it buffers the state from potential
rebel victory� Brandt et al� (2008) find that
rebels win early if they win at all, meaning
that state capacity can protect the government in these early stages and allow them
to hold onto control� Rebels tend to win
early because weak states may be viewed
as incompetent or predatory by the populace, and at the first sign of a viable alternative, the population abandons the
incumbent government, causing it to lose
as a function of its own weakness rather
than as a result of rebels’ military com-
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petence� Thus, stronger states should be
shielded from this effect, preventing the
rebels from winning quickly, consequently
lengthening the duration of civil war�
State capacity, as earlier defined, entails the ability of a government to set and
achieve its policy and military objectives�
In the case of civil war, this thesis contends
that states both want to maintain regime
stability and win the civil war, but keeping the regime stable is a prerequisite for
winning the civil war� Therefore, regime
stability is the most important concern of
a state in the case of civil wars� I contend
that governments are concerned primarily with “ just holding on” because winning
the war is an ancillary goal, subservient to
making sure the leaders of the regime stay
alive� Therefore, in the instances where
the government cannot win a decisive victory quickly, state capacity should enable
the governments to “ just hold on” and
wait the rebels out� Specifically, a strong
military means that attacks by rebels are
less likely to cripple the state’s military
and that the physical safety of the regime
is more secure, both of which lengthen the
amount of time it takes for the rebels to
win� Therefore, I hypothesize that state
capacity should lengthen civil wars�
The natural follow-up question is that,
if a state is strong, shouldn’t that allow it
to win faster, thus shortening conf licts?
However, this thesis still considers cases
only where the state is weak enough to allow a civil war to break out in the first
place� Perhaps winning quickly is too
challenging for these states, and state capacity allows them to hold out, since they
can’t outright defeat the rebels immediately� Moreover, this thesis also constitutes
a set of cases in which the rebel group is
strong enough to amass enough resources to decide to challenge the government

using violence, meaning these cases in
which civil wars break out are already
above some threshold of rebel group viability� This too makes rapid government
victory more difficult� In addition, even
very strong states may find it difficult to
penetrate and govern effectively peripheral regions of their territories� If civil
war breaks out in these regions, strong
states may not be able to win quickly or
may underestimate the threat posed� For
these reasons, I argue that state capacity
should increase the duration of civil wars�
The following hypotheses follow from this
theoretical argument:
H1a: State military expenditures increase
the duration of civil wars.
H1b: State revenues increase the duration
of civil wars.
H1c: State bureaucratic quality increase the
duration of civil wars.

In line with this theory, external support for the government and external support for the rebels should increase the duration of civil wars� External support, be it
through arms, food, or funds, should give
either side more resources to maintain the
status quo of war� On the other hand, rebel
strength relative to the government should
shorten the duration of civil wars, since a
higher relative strength would allow the
rebels to win fast against a relatively weak
state� Below a certain threshold, increases in rebel group strength relative to the
government might not necessarily have an
effect on the duration of the war, since the
government would still maintain an advantage over the rebels� However, over a
certain threshold, increases in rebel group
strength relative to the government might
speed rebel victory or shorten the civil
war� Finally, I hypothesize that rough terrain lengthens civil wars because it allows
rebel groups to squirrel away in the moun-

15
tains, making it harder for the government to seek them out� Moreover, a mountainous terrain may make it harder for the
rebels to access government strongholds,
causing the war to drag on� Therefore,
roughness of a country’s terrain should
increase the duration of civil wars� The
following hypotheses follow from this theoretical argument:

strategies are most effective� Thus, regimes with high state capacity are more
adept at using multiple strategies, leading
to a decrease of battle deaths relative to
conf licts with weaker governments, who
may have to resort to brute force in the
absence of more sophisticated techniques
– or in the worst cases, cannot put up any
credible defense�

H1d: External support for the government
and/or rebels increases the duration of civil
wars.
H1e: Rebel strength relative to the state decreases the duration of civil wars.
H1f: Rough terrain increases the duration
of civil wars.

Examining each aspect of state capacity separately confirms this theory� First,
I predict military expenditures to be negatively associated with battle deaths per
year� Although this is initially counterintuitive, states with high military expenditures can be choosier about which battles
to fight, are more able to minimize their
own casualties, have better intelligence,
and can participate in targeted killings
of rebels, all of which are associated with
lower intensity conf licts� On the other
hand, weak states may be attacked more
frequently, have worse intelligence (which
may lead to mass killings in the absence
of better information), and may not possess the officer corps, financial resources,
equipment, or training to protect their
personnel when attacked� As opposed to
having military engagements foisted upon
them by the rebel group, strong states may
be able to take the offensive and engage
in operations more assured to succeed�
While at first blush, this may appear to
increase rebel battle deaths, the state often
has more personnel than there are rebel
fighters� If states can minimize loss of life
in their own ranks, which strong states
are more capable of doing, the intensity
of the conf lict is likely to diminish� Overall, states with stronger militaries may be
more cautious about using them and possess the restraint not to use them inappropriately, leading to fewer battle deaths� In
addition, I hypothesize that government
revenues and bureaucratic quality are neg-

State Capacity & Intensity
Conf lict intensity relates more strongly
to the second objective of states when engaged in civil war: winning the war itself�
While the preservation of regime stability
necessitates violence, winning the war requires it more strongly� This thesis will
contend that killing members of a rebel
group is but one method of many for winning a civil war� Other strategies may include stifling recruitment, containing the
spread of rebellion and violence, and depriving rebels of funding and arms, among
others� In the second objective of winning
civil wars, inf licting battle deaths will
play an important role, but each strategy
is associated with an opportunity cost� If
a government kills rebels exclusively as its
strategy for winning the war, it probably
won’t be using other strategies, as it diverts resources away from other strategies
toward its selected technique� Conversely,
if a state uses techniques of non-violence
like depriving rebels of new recruits and
targeting supply chains, they will probably focus less on specifically inf licting
battle deaths� Overall, states cannot have
it all – they must pick and choose which
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atively associated with civil war intensity,
since these elements of state capacity provide f lexible resources that can be used on
a variety of governmental objectives beyond simply killing rebels� For example,
higher government revenues can be used
to provide aid to war-torn regions to minimize grievances and stall rebel recruitment; for example, higher revenues could
allow the state to increase public sector
employment, addressing hypothetical rebel concerns about high unemployment�
Likewise, higher bureaucratic quality can
keep government services functioning
during civil strife, preventing the contagion of violence� A high-functioning bureaucracy can also help a strong state find
political settlements to internal conf lict
and facilitate the mediation of differences
between warring factions�
Finally, as described before, strong
states often face rebellions that emerge in
peripheral regions of the country that are
difficult to access and may not be a core
interest for the government� This results
in conf licts of long duration but with relatively few battle deaths, since few military confrontations occur in these internal
conf licts� Perhaps these conflict have long
lulls between violence or consist of long
periods of small-scale guerilla attacks on
police stations and military installations,
which don’t generate as many casualties as
pitched battles� On the other hand, when
the state is weaker, the military challenge
to the state tends to be more serious and
can challenge the government in both rural and urban areas� In these circumstances, military defections may occur, and the
rebel groups may be relatively strong and
well-mobilized� Consistent with my predictions about duration, these conf licts
should be associated with shorter duration
but higher intensity� From these theoretical arguments emerge the following hy-

potheses:
H2a: State military expenditures are negatively associated with battle deaths.
H2b: State revenues are negatively associated with battle deaths.
H2c: State bureaucratic quality is negatively associated with battle deaths.

Considering other factors on civil war
intensity, I hypothesize that conventional
wars should lead to higher battle deaths�
Conventional wars – as defined by Kalyvas
and Balcells (2014) – pit traditional armies
against one another in pitched battles with
clear frontlines� These wars should have
higher battle deaths because more military
personnel are involved in the fighting on
both sides and because both sides possess
more sophisticated technologies of war�
In addition, democratization of a regime
should suppress civil war intensity due
to the public backlash against high battle
deaths� In democracies, governments are
more accountable to the populace, which
is naturally adverse to violence� Thus, democracies have an interest in minimizing
fatality in civil wars� The following hypotheses follow from these considerations:
H2d: Conventional civil wars should experience higher battle deaths.
H2e: Democracies should experience lower
battle deaths.

This thesis will now present my evidence and approach for testing the advanced hypotheses� After the discussion of
this study’s methodology, a presentation of
the results of the statistical analyses and
case studies follow�

Methodology & Case Studies

I

n order to answer the two research
questions posed by this article, I will
employ two different methods and
sources of quantitative data� For my first
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research question – why do some civil
wars last longer than others? – I use Cox
proportional hazard models to examine
which factors are salient for impacting the
length of a civil war conf lict� For my second research question –– why are some
civil wars more intense than others? – I
employ a regression analysis to find the
statistically significant predictors of intensity of conf lict� Per the suggestions of
Hendrix (2010) and Kocher (2010), and as
described above, I intend to use three independent measures of state capacity: (1)
military capacity, (2) fiscal capacity, and
(3) bureaucratic capacity� After I detail
my methodology and data sources for my
quantitative analysis, I will explicate the
selection of and research for my case studies�

Research Question 1 (Duration)
For my first research question, regarding the duration of civil wars, I constructed a dataset based on the UCDP Dyadic
Dataset, version 1-2016, which consists of
all armed conf licts occurring from 19462015� In the UCDP dataset, an armed
conf lict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/
or territory where the use of armed force
between two parties, of which at least one
is the government of a state, results in at
least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year�” Each observation in the dataset
represents a conf lict between a government and a rebel group, as opposed to the
conf lict-year version, where each observation represents a conf lict between a government and all rebel groups opposing it�
My dataset consists of 587 conf lict dyads,
and my dependent variable is the time, in
years, each dyad lasts, which I calculated
based on the start and end dates of each
dyad� To test my hypotheses, I obtained
data on military expenditures, size of

army, government revenues, and bureaucratic quality� For military expenditures,
I used data from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators on military expenditures as a percentage of GDP� I then
lagged the variable by one year to ref lect
the fact that the effect of an increase in
military spending may take some time to
reveal itself� For government revenues, I
also relied on the World Development Indicators’ time series data on government
revenues excluding grants as a percentage
of that country’s GDP� Finally, for bureaucratic quality, I used data from the PRS
Group’s (2017) International Country Risk
Guide, which since 1984 has assigned each
country a yearly score on a scale of 1-6
rating the quality of its bureaucracy�
Other control variables I included as
suggested by the literature include (1) log
total population, (2) log GDP per capita, (3)
whether or not the civil war took place in
the Cold War, (4) ethnic fractionalization,
(5) roughness of the country’s terrain, (6)
how democratic the country is, (7) relative
strength of the rebel group, (8) external
support for the government and rebels,
and (9) “veto players,” or how many dyads
are present in the conf lict� I will discuss
the sources and treatment of each of these
variables in turn�
First and second, I obtained data on
each country’s population and its per capita GDP from the World Development Indicators and then took the natural log of
each observation� Third, I constructed a
dummy variable for whether the civil war
occurred after the Cold War (1 is yes, 0
is no)� Fourth, I took a measure of ethnic fractionalization (the ethno-linguistic
fractionalization measure) from Kalyvas
and Balcells’ (2014) replication data, which
measures the ethnic fractionalization of a
country using the multitude of languages
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spoken in the nation as a proxy� Fifth, I
obtained a measure of how mountainous
each country is from Kalyvas and Balcells
(2014), since several studies point to rough
terrain as a factor in the intensity of civil
war� Sixth, I obtained each nation’s Polity score from the Polity IV dataset; higher values correspond to more democratic
countries, while lower values refer to more
autocratic countries� Seventh, I used a measure of relative rebel strength from Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013)’s
Nonstate Actor Dataset� This measure is
coded on a scale of -2 to 2, with -2 meaning the rebels are much weaker than the
government, -1 meaning they are merely
weaker than the government, 0 meaning
the government and rebels are at parity,
1 meaning the rebels are stronger than
the government, and 2 meaning the rebels
are much stronger than the government�
Thus, positive scores indicate that the
rebels have a military advantage over the
government� Eighth, I obtained data for
external support for the government and
rebels from the UCDP External Support
Dataset (Primary Warring Party Dataset), which states whether or not external
support was provided to the government
and rebel groups (Högbladh, Pettersson,
& Themner, 2011)� Ninth and finally, for
the “veto players” variable, I summed the
number of dyads active in each conf lict at
the time of the observation� I then created
a set of Cox proportional hazard models,
introducing more covariates each time�
The results are presented in subsequent
sections�

Research Question 2 (Intensity)

intensity variable only codes conf licts as
minor (between 25 and 999 battle-related
deaths in a given year) or full-scale war
(1,000 or greater battle-related deaths in
a given year), and many conf licts do not
change between minor and full-scale over
their duration� To remedy this, I rely on
data from the UCDP Battle Deaths Dataset, version 5�0, which is compatible with
the UCDP Dyadic Dataset and contains
data on battle deaths (soldiers and civilians killed in combat) in state-based
armed conf licts between the years 19892015 (Melander, Pettersson, & Themner,
2016)� The Battle Deaths Dataset only
counts deaths caused by the warring parties that can be directly related to combat; it does not, for example, include civilians who die due to disease or starvation
caused by the conf lict� Therefore, this
dataset only measures the intensity of military confrontations, not the war’s wider
impact on loss of life� From this dataset,
I used the best estimate of annual battle
fatalities, of which I then took the natural
log� To test my hypotheses, I use the same
independent variables for state capacity
as my first research question� In terms of
control variables, I use these same independent variables from my first research
question: log population, log GDP per
capita, relative rebel strength, ethnic fractionalization, post-Cold War, Polity score,
and roughness of the country’s terrain� I
included three different variables based on
the prior literature review of conf lict intensity, in which I evaluated whether each
civil war in my dataset was a conventional,
irregular, or SNC war by using Kalyvas
and Balcells’ (2014) measures�

For my second research question, regarding the impact of state capacity on the
intensity of civil wars, I also constructed a
dataset based on the UCDP Dyadic Dataset, version 1-2016� In this dataset, the

After compiling this data, I treated
the dataset as time-series cross-sectional
data and created a panel dataset based on
dyad-year observations� I then created a
random effects linear model for panel data
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and tested the introduction of covariates
on the natural log of battle deaths in each
dyad-year� I tested for heteroskedasticity
in all of the models, and when present, I
provide heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors�

Case Selection
This thesis presents two case studies:
the First Congo War and the Troubles of
Northern Ireland� These cases were chosen
because they provide examples of an extremely weak and extremely strong state,
respectively� On the one hand, in the First
Congo War, the Zairian state had basically ceased to exist, allowing the outbreak
of civil war� As will be discussed later, the
tax collection system of the Zairian state
was virtually nonexistent, and the military
suffered from multiple problems of lack of
professionalism, low pay, and terrorization
of the population� Zaire’s incredible weakness allows this thesis to examine conf lict duration and intensity under circumstances of low state capacity� On the other
hand, the Troubles of Northern Ireland
was chosen as a case study because it represents the other end of the spectrum of
state strength� Northern Ireland is ruled
by the United Kingdom and, as such, is a
province of one of the strongest states in
the world� Despite this high level of state
capacity, violent challenges to the state’s
authority occurred� This case was selected because it may reveal how strong states
behave when faced with internal conf lict�
After the cases were selected, I began
research into the First Congo War� To
research and draw conclusions about the
inf luence of state capacity on the development of the conf lict, I first consulted primary source documents, namely African
newspapers, to construct a timeline of the
war� I also examined the aforementioned
data on military expenditures and govern-

ment revenues to understand the strength
of the Zairian state as the war unfolded�
After developing a timeline of the major
events in the war, I referred to secondary
sources for commentary regarding the inf luence of state capacity on the Zairian government strategy in the war� In the second
case, due to the richness of the scholarship
regarding the Troubles, I relied mainly on
secondary sources in my consideration of
this second case study� I again constructed
a timeline of major events of the Troubles
to understand the evolution of the conf lict,
after which I consulted secondary sources
for their arguments regarding British policy at the time, namely Neumann (2003),
Woodwell (2005), Edwards (2010), and
Weitzer (1987)� Throughout this process, I
referred to primary sources of British policy, namely Cabinet papers and transcripts
of debates in the House of Commons, along
with British newspapers reporting on the
development of the conf lict� Following the
presentation of the major events and shifts
in British response, I analyzed how British
state capacity may have aided or hindered
its government in the search for solutions�
This thesis will now present the findings of its quantitative study, after which
a presentation and discussion of the case
studies follow�

Statistical Findings
Duration

B

eginning with the effect of state
capacity on civil war duration, the
average length of the 587 dyads in
the PRIO/UCDP dataset is 6�189 years�
Figure 1 displays the Kaplan-Meier survival function for all civil war dyads coded
in my dataset� The graph shows that most
conf licts between a government and a rebel group tend to be resolved quickly, while
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Figure 1� Duration of civil wars�

a select few conf licts persist many years,
even decades�
In order to test Hypotheses 1a through
1f, I run several Cox proportional hazard
models, estimating the effect of state capacity on the hazard of a civil war ending� In model 1 of Table 1, I test for the
impact of three measures of state capacity
on the duration of civil wars� Negative coefficients mean a negative association with
the hazard rate of termination; thus, negative coefficients indicate longer conf licts�
In model 1 of Table 1, the only statistically significant variables are the log population of a country and whether or not
the conf lict occurred after the Cold War;
the former makes conf licts longer, and
the latter makes conf licts shorter� This
second finding tentatively confirms H1d,
that external support for the government
or rebels should lengthen civil wars, as
the post-Cold War era has been associated
with a dramatic reduction in the amount
of funding and arms contributed from the
two warring superpowers�
Moving rightward on Table 1, in mod-

els 2 through 5, I add more covariates,
including ethnic fractionalization, roughness of terrain, Polity score, and relative
rebel strength� In these models, post-Cold
War and log population retain their sign
and statistical significance� In addition,
lagged military expenditures achieves statistical significance with a negative sign,
meaning that military capacity is associated with longer conflicts, as hypothesized�
And finally, in models 6 and 7 of Table
1, I add external support for rebels/government and veto players respectively� In
these models, fiscal capacity, as measured
through government revenues, achieves
statistical significance with a negative
sign, indicating that fiscal capacity causes conf licts to endure longer� In addition,
other variables like rough terrain and ethnic fractionalization become statistically
significant at the p<0�1 level, both with
negative signs, meaning that they increase
the duration of civil wars� This confirms
hypothesis 1f, that rough terrain is associated with increased civil war duration�
In addition, in model 7 of Table 1, relative rebel strength is statistically significant at the p<0�05 level, indicating that
rebel strength makes civil wars end sooner� This is as I hypothesized in 1e, given
that a higher relative strength would allow rebels to win fast against a state that’s
relatively weak compared to them� Finally, external support is negatively correlated with the hazard rate and is significant
at the p<0�01 level – external support for
both the rebels and the government seems
to lengthen civil wars substantially, confirming hypothesis 1d�
In Tables 2, 3, and 4 (contained in the
appendix), I test for robustness of my
findings regarding state capacity� Each
of these models contains the same control variables as Table 1 with only one
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Table 1� Impact of state capacity on conflict duration

measure of state capacity included� Table
2 contains military capacity, Table 3 contains fiscal capacity, and Table 4 contains
bureaucratic capacity� In each of these sets
of models, each of my measure of state capacity retains the same statistical significance and sign of Table 1, confirming my
findings that military expenditures and
government revenues are strong predictors of how long a conf lict will last, while
bureaucratic quality fails to achieve statistical significance� In addition, variables
such as relative rebel strength, external
support, rough terrain, log population,
and post-Cold War tend to maintain their
statistical significance and sign of coefficient, which indicates that my findings
are robust� To provide a visual, Figure 3,

also contained in the appendix, presents
the duration of civil war with each of the
three measures of state capacity held at
their 75th percentiles� As the results of the
Cox proportional hazard models would indicate, the Kaplan-Meier curves show that
holding military expenditures and government revenues at their 75th percentile
moves the curve outward, meaning that
military and fiscal capacity lengthens civil
wars� Predictably, the survival curves for
bureaucratic quality above and below the
75th percentile are quite similar�
The findings of Table 1 confirm my
hypothesis that state capacity contributes
to longer civil wars� States with higher
military expenditures and greater fiscal
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resources are able to prolong conf licts, especially when they are unable to win outright� These strong states may also experience civil wars in far-off regions where
they are unable to project power, making
it difficult for them to win quickly� These
states may have militaries strong enough
to withstand rebel attacks and capable
enough to protect the physical safety of
the regime, lengthening the rebels’ time
to victory as well� Surprisingly, bureaucratic quality does not follow this trend,
as it has a positive coefficient, meaning
that more effective bureaucracies end civil wars sooner� This might occur because
stronger bureaucracies are more capable
of credibly committing to a negotiated settlement, and they can negotiate faster� In
addition, stronger bureaucracies can cripple recruitment efforts of rebels and more
effectively control the press, both of which
might prevent the rebels from winning or
allow the government to win faster, thus
shortening the civil war� Bureaucracies
are also unlikely to “offend” or frighten
citizens of the country in the way that displays of military strength might; in this
sense, the exercise of government strength
through the bureaucracy might not inf lame the population against the state in
the same way that f lexing the military
forces might� Finally, external support for
the government and/or rebels causes wars
to drag on because both sides have more
resources available to them, which either
prevents them from being defeated or disincentivizes them from negotiating� As a
result, the post-Cold War era sees shorter
conf licts since this external support is less
available to governments and rebels alike�
But as one predicted, when the rebels are
stronger than the government, civil wars
are shorter in duration – simply because
rebels can win faster�

Intensity
To investigate the effect of state capacity on civil war intensity, I created a
time series cross-sectional dataset with
dyad-year as the unit of observation� Table
5 tests all three measures of state capacity
on battle deaths per year� Beginning with
models 1 and 2 in Table 5, nothing except
the lagged dependent variable is statistically significant� Initially, military expenditures seems to be positively correlated
with battle deaths per year, but in model 3, military expenditures becomes negatively associated with intensity of civil
war and achieves statistical significance�
When ethnic fractionalization is added, it
seems to suppress battle deaths per year
as well� Moving rightward, in model 4, I
add the type of war (conventional, irregular, or SNC) to the model, and we see that
conventional wars and irregular wars are
statistically significant and positively correlated with battle deaths per year� Finally, in model 5 of Table 5, military expenditures retains its statistical significance, as
do the dummy variables for conventional
and irregular wars� In addition, a country’s Polity score is negatively correlated
with intensity, meaning that more democratic countries experience less intense
conf licts�
In Tables 6, 7, and 8 (found in the appendix), I test for robustness by including just one of the three measures of state
capacity in the models� Table 6 contains
models with military expenditures, Table
7 contains models with government revenues, and Table 8 contains models with
bureaucratic quality� In each of these sets
of models, the coefficients of the three
measures of state capacity retain their
negative signs, and only military expenditures is statistically significant, as in Table 5� This confirms hypothesis 2a, but we
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Table 5� Impact of state capacity on conflict intensity�

cannot confirm H2b and H2c, although
the signs of their coefficients are negative�
Conventional and irregular wars continue
to be strongly positively correlated with
battle deaths, and a country’s Polity score
continues to be negatively correlated with
intensity, indicating that democracy can
attenuate violence when civil war breaks
out� Therefore, we can confirm both H2d
and H2e – conventional civil wars appear
to be more intense, and civil wars in democratic countries appear to experience fewer deaths� Thus, my findings appear to be
robust to the inclusion of control variables
and across different measures of state capacity�
A surprising finding is that ethnic fractionalization is consistently negatively

correlated with intensity level of a conf lict� One might expect that ethnic fractionalization increases the intensity of
conf lict; greater levels of ethnic fractionalization may make the state more willing
to kill rebels because combatants on both
sides may be more likely to belong to different religions, making it easier to dehumanize and “otherize” the enemy� In addition, ethnic fractionalization may increase
the strength and unity of rebel groups,
leading to increased deaths due to the rebels successfully killing more government
combatants� However, the results of my
regression analyses require further examination of this hypothesis� Perhaps ethnic
fractionalization is negatively correlated
with civil war intensity levels due to the
way conf lict dyads were constructed for
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the purposes of this research� As described
above, this study treats one state paired
with one rebel group as a conf lict dyad, as
opposed to one state paired with all rebel
groups fighting at once� This might lead
to lower battle deaths in each conf lict dyad
measured but possibly high overall battle-deaths across all rebel groups� States
with higher levels of ethnic fractionalization might theoretically have more rebel
groups and sides involved in the conf lict;
thus, there might be low battle-deaths in
a conf lict against a government and one
rebel group but high total battle-deaths
when accounting for the entire war with
all rebel groups� Therefore, the total number of deaths in a conf lict might be positively correlated with ethnic fractionalization, raising a possible question for future
research of ethnic fractionalization’s impact on conf lict-wide intensity�
To summarize, the picture that emerges
from these findings is one of strong states
that can contain conf licts, protect civilians and their own troops, kill rebels with
more precision and intelligence, and pick
their battles� States with high military expenditures may be able to procure more
sophisticated technologies of warfare and
be choosier in the battles they fight, minimizing casualties on their own side and
killing only the rebels that are necessary
for victory� And while government revenues and bureaucratic quality were not statistically significant, their coefficient was
negative, indicating that these measures of
state strength likely provide governments
with f lexible resources to fight civil wars
in non-violent ways, such as the provision
of aid to war-torn regions or the search
for political solutions to internal conf licts�
Weak states must either resort to tremendous violence in the absence of other coercive tools to seek victory, or they do not
possess the tools to inf lict violence in the

first place� In this latter case, weak states
cannot protect their own troops or shield
civilians from collateral damage� In both
cases, weak states experience more intense
conf licts� As expected, conventional civil
wars experience greater amounts of casualties, given that these wars pit two strong
armies against one another in conventional warfare, causing high amounts of battlefield fatalities� Finally, democratic countries must be more careful when fighting a
civil war, because high casualties threaten
the stability and electability of the current
government� As a result, democracies experience less intense civil wars�
The next section provides two case
studies to illustrate how stronger states
may experience internal conf lict that is
longer but less intense than average� The
first case study, the First Congo War, provides an example of a weak state that experienced a short but bloody civil war� In
this example, an unprofessional military
and a limited government revenue base
prevented the regime in Kinshasa from
forestalling the end of the civil war and
protecting its own personnel and citizens
from violence� In the second case study,
the Troubles of Northern Ireland, a strong
state was challenged by sectarian violence
in a peripheral region of its country and
spent nearly thirty years seeking a political settlement to the conf lict with the limited use of military force�

Case Studies
First Congo War

E

ver since its independence from
Belgium, Congo has exhibited
many of the hallmarks of a weak
state� When it achieved independence in
1960, a lack of central authority and regional fragmentation enabled high levels
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of political violence and division, especially along ethnic lines (Young & Turner, 1985)� Political mobilization in Congo
occurred on ethnic lines not due to rigid
ethnic identities – and in fact, many scholars describe the considerable f luidity of
Congolese ethnic identities at the time –
but rather due to the lack of state legitimacy and institutions (Breuilly, 1994)� In
the absence of this central power, Chief
of the Army Mobutu Sese Seko staged a
coup in 1965 and established his regime
in the state he renamed Zaire (Young &
Turner, 1985)� While the relative weakness of the government is not unusual for
a state emerging from colonial rule, what
is unusual about Congo is just how weak
it remained for decades� As the post-coup
decades went on, the Zairian state weakened in the three key measures of state
strength advanced by this thesis: (1) military strength, (2) revenue collection and
government spending, and (3) bureaucratic quality� This thesis will first illustrate
this decline in state strength, after which
it presents the evolution of Zairian conf lict� This section will end by arguing that
the quick but intense victory of the rebels
in the first Congo War was related to the
lack of Zairian state capacity�
State Decline
First, due to a lack of serious internal or
external challenges to its authority, Mobutu’s regime could afford to have a corrupt,
ineffective, and weak military� The main
role of the Zairian national army (FAZ)
was to promote internal security with
little consideration of national defense
(O’Ballance, 2000)� Mobutu understood
well the risk that a strong military could
pose to a ruler, having himself seized power in a coup� Thus, the Mobutu regime
had a vested interest in maintaining a
weak military (Atzili, 2007)� With this in

mind, Mobutu systematically rechanneled
resources earmarked for the military towards his Presidential Guard (Shearer,
1999)� This lack of investment eventually
came back to haunt Mobutu in the 1970s,
when the regime faced internal rebellion
in the two Katanga rebellions� When faced
with this internal conf lict, Mobutu had to
outsource the protection of the national
defense to Moroccan and French troops
to compensate for Zaire’s weak army (Callaghy, 1984)� Even after this threat abated,
Mobutu continued to neglect the military,
refusing to pay Zaire’s military personnel
with state funds� Instead, he encouraged
them to seek payment through extortion
of the citizenry, such as kidnapping for
ransom or looting (Reno, 1998)� Michael
Shafer (1982) summarizes the importance
of the military in Zairian politics as resulting in “Mobutu’s extraordinary efforts to divide, control, manipulate, politicize, and otherwise deinstitutionalize and
de-professionalize it�” Overall, the Zairian
military was ill-equipped to handle the
coming civil war that would soon tear the
region apart�
Second, a strong state needs taxation
and revenues in order to survive, and the
Zairian state struggled to obtain these
revenues� The Zairian tax collection system was fraudulent and ineffectual� The
World Development Indicators (2016) data
show Zaire’s tax revenues in the 1970s
and 1980s at a measly 6-11 percent of the
country’s GDP, a number which dropped
to 5 percent of GDP by 1995� For comparison, the WDI data show the United States
at roughly 18 percent of GDP around the
same time, which is considered a low level of tax collection by Western standards�
Moreover, Callaghy (1984) notes that so
many economic transactions were being
conducted in the Zairian black market that
the actual tax burden on Zaire’s citizens
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was probably miniscule� In the absence of
a robust tax collection system, Mobutu relied on external support, foreign debt, and
short-term policies to sustain the network
of patrimony he used to control the state
(Atzili, 2007)� Young and Turner (1985)
describe how Mobutu seized vast swaths
of land and commercial enterprises owned
by foreign nationals in a movement he
called “Zairianization�” This immense sequestration of economic resources allowed
Mobutu to distribute even more goods
to the political class, thus bolstering his
patrimonial system� Therefore, the lack of
consistent revenues greatly crippled the
ability of the Zairian state to plan, budget,
and deliver public services�
But even when there were revenues to
spend, the Mobutu regime “spent little on
public goods, and when it did, the focus
was mostly on extravagant, highly visible, and often misguided projects” (Atzili,
2007, p� 159)� For example, the government poured nearly a billion dollars into
the construction of the Ingha-Shaba Dam
and an associated high-power grid that
transferred the dam’s energy to the nearby Shaba mines, projects which could have
used much cheaper energy sources� While
these lavish, high-profile infrastructure
development continued, state spending on
social services dwindled from 17�5 percent
in 1972 to under 1 percent in 1992 (Lemarchand, 2001)� Moreover, as the years
went on, more and more money was diverted from the state’s budget to a discretionary fund for the president – by 1992,
95 percent of Zaire’s annual budget went
either to Mobutu’s personal accounts or
to the accounts of his beneficiaries (Atzili,
2007)� Even when the government spent
funds on investment projects, peripheral
provinces were marginalized, while the
capital and core regions received the lion’s share of investment� Young and Turn-

er (1985) describe how Kinshasa was only
home to 6 percent of Zaire’s population
but was allocated 31 percent of the budget for government investments� On the
other hand, Kasai Province held nearly 20
percent of the country’s population and received virtually no funds� Overall, the revenue collection of the Zairian regime was
far from robust, and even when it managed
to collect funds, the government rarely
spent its revenues equitably or effectively�
Third and finally, an effective state
must rely on bureaucracies and institutions to set and achieve governmental
objectives� Zaire also lacked this quality
of an strong state� As Young and Turner
(1985) note, the state of Zaire did not exist in a meaningful sense outside of Mobutu’s personal authority� Although Mobutu originally paid lip service to building
Zaire’s institutions – namely through his
1967 founding of the Popular Movement
of the Revolution, Zaire’s sole political
party – these institutions performed few
services and often merely allowed Mobutu
to further his personal control over the education system, the military, and regional
authorities (Atzili, 2007)� In the absence of
meaningful reforms, Mobutu waged two
public relations campaigns: “Authenticity”
in 1971 and “Mobutism” in 1974� These
public relations campaigns, coupled with
milquetoast economic reforms like Zairianization and “Radicalization” in 1974,
represented Mobutu’s attempts to curry
favor with the populace and other African
leaders through rhetoric (Callaghy, 1984)�
Much like he downsized the military,
Mobutu preferred to shrink the size of the
Zairian bureaucracy, fearful of the threat it
could pose as an independent power base,
and instead relied on a network of clients
to provide state services (Reno, 1998)� By
1975, faced with growing foreign debt and
economic woes caused by the falling price
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of copper, Mobutu abandoned even the
pretense of nation building and chose to
protect his own authority by monopolizing resources for himself and his patrimonial network (Weinstein, 2000)� This shift
away from institution building paved the
way for state deterioration and, eventually, civil war� Overall, the Zairian state had
a weak military, poor revenue extraction,
ineffective government spending and distribution of public goods, and incompetent
bureaucracies and institutions� All of these
deficiencies contributed to its loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the people, leading to
the onset of the First Congo War, as described in the next section�
Onset of Civil War
For centuries, tensions had existed between various ethnic groups in eastern
Zaire, and these tensions would eventually
contribute to the onset of the First Congo War� Since the 1800s, members of the
semi-nomadic Tutsi tribe had emigrated
to eastern Zaire, some forcibly relocated
to Congo to perform manual labor for Belgian colonialists and others later f leeing
the 1950s social revolution that brought
the Hutus to power in Rwanda (Lemarchand, 2009)� Tutsis who emigrated from
Rwanda before Congolese independence in
1960 are referred to as Banyamulenge and
had the right to citizenship under Zairian law (Vlassenroot, 2002)� After Zaire
achieved independence, Tutsis continued to emigrate from Rwanda, and these
latecomers were known as Banyarwanda�
However, “native” locals – members of the
Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga ethnic groups
– often failed to distinguish between the
two Tutsi groups, referring to them both
as Banyamulenge and treating them as
foreigners (Mollel, 2008)� After solidifying his control of the country in the
1960s, Mobutu helped select members of

Banyamulenge, along with other minority ethnic groups across the country, climb
to top political positions in the eastern regions, hoping to prevent more populous
ethnicities from coalescing into credible
opposition (Autesserre, 2008)� This move
exacerbated existing ethnic grievances, as
manifested in the Kanyarwandan War, in
which members of the Hunde and Nande
ethnic groups massacred Rwandan emigrants (Lemarchand, 2009)� In 1981, in
an attempt to improve his popularity in
the region, Mobutu too eventually turned
against the Banyamulenge, portraying
them as “Rwandans” (Weinstein, 2000)�
Throughout the mid-1990s, the Hunde,
Nande, and Nyanga regularly attacked the
Banyamulenge, killing 14,000 Tutsis in
the process (Lemarchand, 2009)�
The definitive event that precipitated
the First Congo War was the outbreak of
the Rwandan genocide� During the 100day genocide, nearly 800,000 Tutsis were
slaughtered by Hutu aggressors, which
caused Tutsis to f lee en masse from the
country in an exodus that was called the
Great Lakes refugee crisis (Straus, 2013)�
The Rwandan genocide was brought to an
end in July 1994 by the overthrow of the
Hutu government in Kigali by the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front�
Over the course of the crisis, 1�5 million
refugees f led across the border to eastern
Zaire, including Tutsis who f led the Hutu
génocidaires but also those that feared reprisal from new Tutsi RPF regime� This
latter group consisted of the génocidaires
themselves, the former Rwandan army
(FAR), and independent Hutu paramilitary groups known as the Interahamwe
(Reyntjens, 2009)� Many of these second
group of refugees took up residence in refugee camps in the Kivu region of Zaire
and established the camps as bases for rearming themselves (Weinstein, 2000)� In
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the first half of 1996, nearly one hundred
Tutsi – Rwandan and Zairian Banyamulenge – died per month in attacks launched
over the Zaire-Rwanda border from residents of refugee camps (Gribbin, 2005)� In
response to the massive inf lux of refugees
over its borders, the Zairian Parliament
ordered all peoples of Rwandan or Burundian descent to be repatriated to their
countries, including the Banyamulenge
(Lemarchand, 2009)� However, many refugees resisted repatriation, and the Hutu
génocidaires grew bolder as Mobutu actively supported their training and supplied them for an invasion of Rwanda
(Reyntjens, 2009)� As attacks from Hutus
harboring inside Zaire continued, the new
RPF leadership in Kigali began to train
and equip the Banyamulenge in order to
protect themselves from cross-border attacks from Hutu refugees (Shearer, 1999)�
The long-simmering ethnic tensions finally boiled over in an exchange of gunfire between Rwandan Tutsi and Zairian
Green Berets on August 31st, 1996 (Reyntjens, 2009)� This battle marked the beginning of the Banyamulenge Rebellion,
the primary goal of which was to expel
extremist Hutu forces from east Zaire
and seize power in the Kivu provinces�
The government in Kigali finally chose
to deploy its Tutsi militias for operations
in Zaire, and on October 7th, 1996, the
Rwandan government supported Banyamulenge who began an uprising in the Kivu
town of Bukavu, after the vice-governor
based there proclaimed that Banyamulenge would have to leave (Solomon, 1997)�
The Banyamulenge managed to fend off
an attack by the FAZ, causing tensions
to rise between Rwanda and Zaire, which
eventually culminated in an exchange of
mortar fire over Lake Kivu between the
two nations’ armed forces (Reyntjens,
2009)� As the Banyamulenge Rebellion

began to spiral out of control in late 1996,
other enemies of Mobutu in multiple sectors joined forces with the Banyamulenge
in what they named the Alliance for Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL)� The AFDL fought under the
banner of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, a former
Marxist rebel who led one of the three
major rebel groups that combined into
the AFDL (Quinn, 2004)� The violence
in east Zaire in October 1996 is regarded
by scholars as the beginnings of the First
Congo War� The next section describes
the progression of the conf lict and its resolution through the toppling of Mobutu a
bloody seven months later�
Progression of the War.
By late October, the AFDL had defeated the Zairian forces occupying Uvira and Bukavu, and the AFDL controlled
the land between the two cities� See Figure 4 for a map of the AFDL offensive in
the First Congo War� As an AfricaFocus
bulletin reported on October 26th, 1996,
“The FAZ are losing territory and retreating, sometimes even before engaging
the rebels” (IRIN Briefing, 1996)� In a response to this rapid territorial loss, on November 20th, 1996, Mobutu suspended the
Zairian Army Chief of Staff, General Eluki Monga Aundu, and replaced him with
Lieutenant-General Mahele Bokungo Lieko, who had a successful history of crushing armed rebellion� In addition, Mobutu
transferred the Presidential Division and
Civil Guard under Mahele’s direct command, providing the FAZ with superior
quantities and quality of arms (“Mobutu
Appoints,” 1996)� However, Mobutu’s attempts to reform the military seemed to
be in vain� The FAZ continued to backpedal into the end of the year, as the rebels
controlled Uvira, Bukavu, Goma, Bunia,
Walikale, Butembo, and Lubero by De-
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Figure 4� Map of AFDL offensives from Stearns (2012)�

cember (Solomon, 1997)� As a reporter
from Business Day in Johannesburg noted in January 1997, “The rebel movement
that was born in the hills of east Zaire effortlessly routed the army, seized towns,
dismantled refugee camps and sent thousands of recalcitrant Rwandans home�
Nothing, it seemed last year, could halt
the Alliance of Democratic Forces for
the Liberation of Congo-Zaire” (Wrong,
1997a)� This capture of nearly 800 x 100
km of territory along the border of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi caused a pause

in the rebel advance, temporarily satisfying them and giving them buffer against
the former génocidaires� This pause continued until late January 1997 (Reyntjens,
2009)� During this time, the AFDL and
Rwandan forces committed many atrocities against Hutu refugees, and Amnesty International (1998) estimates that as
many as 200,000 Rwandese Hutu refugees were massacred in this time� While
the AFDL and RPF carefully managed
NGO and press access to the areas where
these atrocities occurred, the United Na-
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tions Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights later conducted a mapping
exercise of atrocities in the First Congo
War and documented the killing of tens
of thousands of Hutu civilians (United Nations Office, 2009)�
After a quiet start to 1997, the Mobutu regime announced a counter-offensive
against the AFDL in the eastern provinces� Mobutu hired European and African
mercenaries around January 20th, along
with members of the Angolese UNITA
and Rwanda’s exiled Hutu army (“Belgian
leads,” 1997)� Revealing the weakness of
the state, government troops resorted to
looting, banditry, and exactions as they
f led in disarray from towns across the
country (“14 Zairean Soldiers,” 1997)� The
Zairian counteroffensive placed the frontline at the central towns of Walikale and
Tingi-Tingi, pinning 400,000 refugees
between the advancing FAZ troops and
the AFDL� However, with the rebels’ capture of the Lake Tanyanyika port of Kalemie around February 3rd, 1997, the government’s counter-offensive faltered, and
the AFDL proceeded to handily seize Punya, Moba, the Tingi-Tingi refugee camp,
and Lubutu by mid-February (“Calls for
Zairean premier,” 1997)� By this point,
blaming his neglect of the army for the
rebels’ steady advance, opposition newspapers took to openly poking fun at Mobutu’s
prostate cancer, and the rapid depreciation
of the Zairian currency caused citizens to
start referring to the zaire as “prostates”
(“Mobutu cracks down,” 1997)�
The AFDL then headed westward in
two pincer movements, the north of which
eventually took Isiro, putting it in control of 1000 km of territory along Zaire’s
eastern border (Mills, 1997)� The southern pincer movement began with Kalima
and its refugee camp, which fell to the

rebels on February 25th, and those present described the takeover as orderly and
peaceful: “They were disciplined, so we
knew they were not Zairian troops,” remarked an American procurer for the
Catholic Church� The takeover of Kalima put the AFDL in charge of a 1450 km
strip of territory (“Refugees f lee camp,”
1997)� Around this time, nine senior officers of the FAZ defected to join the rebels
in late February� The officers cited “low
morale, years of low wages, and dismal
living conditions … but what demoralized them the most was a two-tiered army
command – one from the armed forces and
the other from a ground of underground
commanders close to Mobutu” (“Reports
of Zairean troops looting,” 1997)� As Williams (1997) argues, “Armies founded on
internal pacification are always better at
bullying and terrorizing the local populace than fighting a well-disciplined force�
The Zairian army rapidly disintegrated,
exposing Mobutu’s soft underbelly�” With
the FAZ in shambles, the southern AFDL
forces captured Kindu with ease by midMarch, and the northern pincer traveled
down from Isiro to capture Kisangani, the
third-largest city in Zaire and also the
site of the local headquarters of the FAZ
(“While the relief basics pour in,” 1997)�
Next, the AFDL set its sights on
Lubumbashi in the south, the country’s
second largest city and hub of copper and
cobalt mining� On its march south, the
AFDL took Pweto, and regional military
sources remarked that “[t]he rebels took
Pweto with little fighting because government troops were afraid of their advance and afraid of popular anger directed
against them by residents” (“Zairean city
is next target,” 1997)� The AFDL next
prepared a pincer movement on Lubumbashi from Kamina in the northwest and
Kasenga in the northeast� In early April,
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they captured the diamond capital Mbuji-Mayi, where “[t]raders said Zairian soldiers based in the town were nowhere to
be seen” (“Zaire’s rebels push on,” 1997)�
Over time, it became apparent that the
FAZ’s counter-strategy appeared rooted in minimal resistance, when it chose
to fight back at all� The rebels captured
Lubumbashi in mid-April, where they
were cheered by residents ready for regime
change, and despite the rebels’ capture of
these mineral-rich regions, mining companies expressed confidence that ratification
of their existing deals could be concluded
with rebel leaders (“Mobutu battles to regain,” 1997)� Later that month, on April
17th, American Mineral Fields sealed a $1
billion deal to develop the Kolwezi copper
tailings project in Zaire through a backdoor agreement with the AFDL, giving
Kabila a much-needed boost of revenue
(“Zairean rebel leader Kabila,” 1997)�
The AFDL captured three more towns
by April 25th and routed the north and
south pincer movements to advance
steadily on Kinshasa from the Bandundu
province in the north and from Kikwit in
the east (“Seven years after,” 1997)� While
the AFDL troops marched inexorably
onwards, Kabila paused to meet with international officials to discuss the fate of
85,000 Hutu refugees who disappeared
south of Kisangani� This was not the first
time the AFDL was accused of committing atrocities, as the UN refugee agency reported claims of three mass graves
near the empty refugee camps of Kibumba, Katale, and Kilimanyako (“Hundreds
of f leeing Hutus,” 1997)� Kabila brushed
off the concerns of international mediators, calling the disappearance of these
refugees “a little problem”� The AFDL
was also under international heat for the
massacre of thousands of refugees in the
Tingi-Tingi refugee camp in early March

(“UN alarmed,” 1997)� Given the conf lict’s
high levels of civilian victimization, the
international community had attempted to
negotiate a settlement throughout the war,
but now, growing increasingly fearful of
the instability of the country, South Africa finally succeeded, with Mobutu and
Kabila agreeing to peace talks hosted by
Nelson Mandela (Laufer, 1997)� However,
these peace talks were largely unsuccessful, with Mobutu only agreeing to step
down after a long transition period, while
Kabila demanded Mobutu’s immediate resignation (“Zaire: Mobutu said ‘willing to
step down,’” 1997)� Reyntjens (2009) contends that the AFDL did not take these
negotiations seriously but instead participated only to appear willing to attempt a
diplomatic solution, while still continuing
to press steadily onwards�
After repeated international attempts
to bring both parties to the table again,
the AFDL eventually reached striking
distance of Kinshasa’s airport around May
6th (“US presses Kabila,” 1997)� Tensions
ran high in Kinshasa for the next two
weeks, as residents expected the rebels
to attack from multiple directions, finally activating their long-promised western
front by ordering in hundreds of Katangese fighters waiting across the Angolan border (Wrong, 1997c)� Attempts to
mount a more serious defense were undermined by Mobutu’s worsening cash
crisis; since the rebels seized Zaire’s diamond and copper-producing regions, the
oil industry was virtually the government’s only source of revenue� Businessmen reported Prime Minister Gen Likulia
Bolongo “ha[d] gone cap in hand to leading companies, demanding contributions�
At the central bank, the presses [kept]
printing money, but with the highest denomination worth just $0�28, the procedure produce[d] little in terms of money
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supply” (Wrong, 1997b)� In a desperate attempt to shore up the military in the final
days of the war, the authorities also tried
to launch a military recruitment drive at
the university in Kinshasa� Traditionally,
the student population supported the radical opposition� As one student remarked
to the South African Business Day newspaper on May 8th, “Joining the losing side
at this late stage did not seem a good idea”
(Wrong, 1997b)�
On May 12th, the AFDL resumed its
march towards Kinshasa, abandoning its
pledge to Mandela to wait for a second
round of peace talks� And by May 17th,
1997, the rebels marched triumphantly
through Kinshasa, cheered by onlookers
and met with isolated resistance (“ANC
congratulates,” 1997)� The AFDL fanned
throughout the city, captured Mobutu’s
riverside palace and its nearby fortified
military base, and ordered government
troops to surrender their weapons by the
end of the day� Zairian soldiers readily
complied, eager to tie white cloths around
their heads to show their support for Kabila� “Today, we finally feel free,” said former army captain William Mazaza to the
South African Business Day as he handed in his weapons to the AFDL (“Rebels stamp their authority,” 1997)� Nelson
Mandela remarked, “As far as Kabila is
concerned, he will enter Kinshasa without
bloodshed� His troops have been acknowledged, even by his enemies, as being disciplined and courteous” (“Mandela: Kabila
doing ‘excellent’ job,” 1997)� In an address
to the nation, Kabila proclaimed himself
president on May 17 and immediately ordered a violent crackdown to restore order
to the country� He then reorganized the
nation under the name it goes by today –
the Democratic Republic of the Congo�

Analysis
The First Congo War provides an example of a short but bloody civil war in which
the state was weak, and the weakness of
Zaire contributed both to the short duration of the war and also its high intensity�
First, state weakness likely contributed to
the short duration of the First Congo War
due to the weakness of the Zairian military and the government’s limited revenue
collection� Throughout the war, the FAZ
failed to stop the AFDL advance and, on
many occasions, chose not to fight back at
all� Often, Zairian soldiers were nowhere
to be seen, as the rebels took city after city
(“Zaire’s rebels push on,” 1997)� As Solomon (1997) notes, “As the war continued,
it became obvious that Mobutu’s generals
did not have a military counter-strategy
… even with a military plan, Kinshasa
would not have the available soldiers to
transport to the battlefield�” While it is
impossible to say for certain, the war may
have lasted longer if the Zairian army had
posed more of a credible threat or won
even a few battles�
Moreover, the FAZ often did the work
of recruitment for the rebels through their
looting and pillaging of towns, causing local citizens to celebrate when the AFDL
finally arrived� A more professional military and higher military expenditures
to pay personnel may have prevented the
rapid disintegration of the Zairian forces
when faced with the AFDL threat� Even if
Mobutu still eventually lost, it is likely that
he would have held on at least marginally
longer if his military had been more able
or willing to fight back� Similarly, a lack
of government revenues severely crippled
the Mobutu regime by the end of the war�
As the AFDL seized region after region,
Mobutu’s neo-patrimonial network began
to collapse, giving the regime few sourc-
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es of revenue� By the end, as the rebels
approached Kinshasa, the meager oil industry was the only source of cash for the
government, forcing the Prime Minister
to beg for contributions from businesses
(Wrong, 1997b)� Higher government revenues may have prevented the war from
ending so quickly, as Mobutu may have
been able to divert funds to paying personnel, hiring more mercenaries, or buying more military equipment� To these
ends, state weakness likely contributed to
the short duration of the war�
Second, the intensity of the First Congo
War is also likely related to the weakness
of the Zairian state� Compared to other
civil wars, Zaire saw relatively high battle deaths� The median number of annual battle deaths in the Battle Deaths 5�0
dataset is 189 deaths per year, while the
First Congo War saw 5,761 casualties in
just seven months of conf lict (Lacina &
Gleditsch, 2005)� Figure 5 contains a histogram of average battle deaths per year
for all conf licts noted in the UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conf lict Dataset� Moreover, the
Battle Deaths Dataset does not include civilian deaths, which occurred in startling
amounts in the First Congo War� As stated earlier, some estimates of civilian victimization in the war number in the hundreds of thousands, indicating that weak
states may not be able to protect civilians
from the rebel group once civil war breaks
out (Amnesty International, 1998)�
Moreover, undisciplined government
forces may turn to looting, pillaging, and
inf licting violence upon the civilian population in the absence of formal remuneration� In the case of Zaire, Mobutu encouraged such behavior, reportedly asking his
soldiers once why they needed salaries
when they had guns instead (“Congo’s
Curse,” 2010)� Moreover, unsophisticated

technologies, low military expenditures,
and untrained personnel all contributed
to high loss of life in the Zairian forces,
indicating that weak states may be less
able to protect themselves in battle� While
weaker states may also be unable to inf lict
heavy casualties on rebel groups, their inability to minimize their own casualties
might explain the negative correlation between state strength and intensity of civil
wars� In the example of the First Congo
War, a weak state was unable to protect
itself from loss of civilian and military life,
unable to raise the funds to mount a national defense, and unable to forestall the
toppling of its own regime, even if only for
a few months� Thus, the Zairian case exemplifies how state strength may be positively correlated with civil war duration
and negatively correlated with intensity�

The Troubles

O

n the other hand, the Troubles of
Northern Ireland represent a case
in which a strong state – in fact,
one of the strongest states in the world,
the United Kingdom – experienced internal conf lict with low intensity and long
duration� For nearly thirty years, between
1969 and 1998, Northern Ireland, a province of the United Kingdom, experienced
ethnic conf lict over the constitutional
and political status of the province visà-vis Britain; over the course of the conf lict, 3,532 people died, of whom 1,841
were civilians (Fay, Morrissey, Morrisey,
& Smyth, 1999)� By virtue of the fact that
this case is thirty years in length, while
the Zaire’s civil war lasted only seven
months, this study will devote considerably more time to outlining the developments in the internal conf lict� This case
study begins with a discussion of the geographic, political, and ethnic tensions that
existed prior to the outbreak of internal
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conf lict, followed by an explanation of the
evolution of the conf lict�
Background
The root grievance held by participants
in the Troubles centered around the constitutional status of Northern Ireland� The
majority of Northern Ireland’s population
were unionists, who wanted Northern Ireland to remain in the United Kingdom,
and many of whom were Protestant descendants of colonists from Great Britain� However, a significant minority were
Catholic and nationalists, who wanted
Northern Ireland to unite with the Republic of Ireland, creating a unified Ireland independent of Great Britain (Foster, 1989)�
Even to this day, public polling shows that
unionists tend to see themselves as British, and nationalists tend to identify as
Irish (Northern Ireland Life and Times,
2014)� Thus, the conf lict took place along
political, religious, and ethnic lines, much
of which was caused by Anglo-Irish history leading up to the Troubles�
Nationalists contend that Anglo-Irish
history started in the year 1170, when
Strongbow and other Normans invaded
Ireland, but it is arguable whether the socalled Old English actually can be considered “English” (Kee, 1989)� Regardless,
only in the sixteenth century did the loose
relationship between the island of Great
Britain and the island of Ireland begin to
shift� By the death of Elizabeth I in 1602,
the monarchy “could properly claim to
have conquered most of Ireland” (Adelman
& Pearce, 2001, p� 3)� Shortly thereafter,
settlers from Scotland and England established a Protestant community in Ireland, and between the early seventeenth
and late eighteenth century, the British
government exercised only informal and
loose control over Ireland, preferring to
treat it as a ‘place apart�’ This marked

the beginning of the British treatment of
Ireland as a region on its periphery� Frustrated by this treatment, the Republican
rebellion of the 1790s first articulated the
principle of the unity of the Irish people,
as well as their separation from England�
Having previously granted legislative independence to an Irish parliament in 1782,
the unrest caused by this insurrection ultimately caused London to resume the direct government of the island in the early
1800s (Foster, 1989)� The Act of Union
in 1801 abolished this Irish parliament in
Dublin and formally annexed the island
of Ireland to Great Britain, which laid the
roots for a conf lict between supporters of
the United Kingdom and supporters of
Irish Nationalism�
In 1845-49, the infamous Great Irish
Famine occurred, when a potato blight
destroyed two-thirds of Irish potatoes,
leading to an estimated 1 million deaths�
London’s response to this crisis was decidedly lackluster, marked by public relief
schemes being abandoned in 1846 by the
newly-elected Whig government and the
continued selling of Irish potatoes abroad
(Foster, 1989)� Neumann (2003) characterizes London’s response to the famine as
one of “initial disinterest, aloofness, and
crisis management” (p� 12)� Gradually over
the nineteenth century, recognizing their
failure in governance during the famine,
British politicians developed the solution
of “home rule,” which granted Dublin independence in a number of policy areas
while maintaining constitutional linkages
to the United Kingdom (Murphy, 1986)�
The introduction of a modest home rule
bill in 1912 sufficiently alarmed Unionists in Northern Ireland, causing Unionists and Nationalists to form paramilitary
organizations to defend their respective
causes (Foster, 1989)� In 1919, anger bubbled over as the Irish War of Independence
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broke out� After the resolution of this war,
an act of British parliament partitioned
the island of Ireland into Northern Ireland
and Southern Ireland, the latter of which
became the Irish Free State in 1922� 1921
represents the formal creation of the province of Northern Ireland as a separate entity, which before was merely a collection
of six counties in Ireland�
However, the partition of Ireland into
Northern Ireland and the southern Republic of Ireland exacerbated the ethnic conf lict within the province� Northern Ireland
consisted mainly of Protestants who wanted to remain in the United Kingdom, but a
significant minority of Catholic Nationalists still wanted Northern Ireland to join
the Republic of Ireland� Especially after
the end of the Second World War, tensions
continued to build and eventually came to
a head in the late 1960s� Around this time,
several Nationalist civil rights marches
occurred, many of which were attacked by
Unionists, and Unionist organizations began to organize counter-demonstrations
(Neumann, 2003)� The conf lict finally
boiled over in August 1969, when the British Army was deployed to the streets of
Northern Ireland after riots and attacks
in Belfast, marking the beginning of the
Troubles� The Troubles pitted republican paramilitaries such as the Provisional
Irish Republican Army (IRA) against loyalist paramilitaries such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defense
Association (UDA)� British state security
forces, including the British Army and the
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), eventually became embroiled in the conf lict�
As a brief note, this thesis will refer
generally to Unionists and Nationalists
as groups of individuals who wanted respectively to remain in or leave the United Kingdom� The more radical strains of

each ideology will be referred to as Loyalism (for Unionism) and Republicanism
(for Nationalism)� In addition, because
there were fewer Catholics in Northern
Ireland, this thesis occasionally uses the
terminology of majority/minority to refer
respectively to Protestants and Catholics�
Over the next sections, this thesis will detail the evolution of the conf lict over five
distinct periods: 1969-72, 1972-75, 197682, 1982-88, and 1989-98� Throughout
the discussion of the conf lict, this thesis
will pay particular attention to the evolution of British military, economic, and political strategies� After each section, this
thesis will consider how the case of the
Troubles may be illustrative of some of the
earlier arguments regarding state capacity: namely, that strong states tend to experience longer but less intense conf licts
on average�
1969 – 1972
Before August 15th, 1969, the primary
British military strategy was to avoid the
deployment of British troops (Neumann,
2003)� But the Northern Ireland riots of
August 1969, in which six Catholics and
two Protestants were shot dead and 133
were treated for gunshot wounds, forced
the British government to respond by deploying the British Army on the streets
of Northern Ireland (Kelley, 1982)� When
the British government agreed to provide
these troops “in aid of the civil power,”
it had decided that its primary aim was
the re-insulation of Great Britain from
the conf lict occurring in Northern Ireland – meaning, London sought to avoid
contagion of the conf lict to the mainland
(Neumann, 2003)� Immediately, then, the
objective was to revitalize the Stormont
system of Irish home rule, which would
restore the constitutional status quo before the war� But this did not appear to be
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cess as possible” to ensure the protection
of civil rights (Hansard Archives of the
House of Commons [Hansard], 1970)� As
Neumann (2003) puts it, “[t]here was no
point in embarking on a mission to assert
the authority of constitutional government
if its defense involved the abolition of what
one wanted to preserve” (p� 29)�
Northern Irish citizens juxtaposed against
British Marines (Hillen, 1980)�

a long term strategy: as early as August
19th, 1969, Home Secretary James Callaghan stated it was “urgent” to “press on
with the reorganization of the regular police forces” (Public Record Office [PRO],
1969)� It became clear that the government’s priority was to ensure the swift
withdrawal of British troops and to protect the British mainland�
Moreover, British strategic thinking
around this time seemed to center around
two major principles: first, the principle of
minimum force, and second, the maintenance of civilian government� In the first
principle, the security forces’ role is regarded as obeying the duty to respond to force
only with what is absolutely necessary to
restore law and order (Mockaitis, 1995)�
To this end, British government officials
believed there could be no “military solution” – to coerce the population through
violence or put down any violent expression with military means alone would have
violated the principle of minimum force�
It was also regarded as counterproductive: a solution would have to be found “by
proper parliamentary, constitutional, and
electoral processes, [because] this is the
British way of doing things”, said Arthur
Young, the newly-appointed head of the
RUC (“Military police take over,” 1969)�
In a similar vein, the British government
wanted to preserve “as normal a legal pro-

In addition to military strategy, the
British government also implemented in
1969 an agenda of political reforms� Results from the Cameron Commission’s
report showed that Catholics harbored
many political and social grievances regarding the allocation of housing, jobs,
and the manipulation of electoral boundaries� Protestants, on the other hand, were
concerned about the constitutional status
of Northern Ireland as a part of the UK
(Cameron, 1969)� In response to this finding, the British government encouraged
a series of legal safeguards, such as a law
against the incitement of religious hatred,
the establishment of a Commissioner for
Complaints, and the creation of a Ministry for Community Relations (Neumann,
2003)� In addition, criticisms of local policing were noted led to three new policies:
(1) the RUC, the police force in Northern
Ireland, was made into a “British” police
force, (2) the Ulster Special Constabulary
was disbanded in the wake of criticisms of
Protestant partisanship, and (3) the Ulster
Defense Regiment (UDR) was established
under the command of the British Army
as a new locally recruited part-time force�
By late 1969, though, the British military strategy of minimum force had been
interpreted as “minimum action,” and
the newly appointed English head of the
RUC even described his approach as “softly, softly” (“Military police take over,”
1969)� In practice, this allowed Protestant
marches to intensify, and “no go” areas in
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Derry-City and West-Belfast were established, creating pockets where the IRA
was free to organize (Kelley, 1982)� Britain
also initially failed to recognize the IRA as
a credible threat, and by early 1970, riots
became a part of everyday life (Neumann,
2003)� By this point, the Provisional IRA
had split from the Official IRA, and the
Provisional IRA (henceforth referred to as
the IRA) successfully baited the security
forces into a repressive reaction, allowing
them to skillfully escalate their campaign
to the point they gained the confidence
to launch an offensive against the British
forces (Smith, 2002)�
The conf lict escalated in mid-1970
with intense riots erupting in parts of
Derry and Belfast, leading to gun battles between unionists and nationalists
in which seven people were killed (Bell,
1993)� However, the British government
characterized this renewed outbreak of
violence as a combination of excessive
drinking, long evenings, boredom, and a
“taste of excitement” on behalf of Catholic teenagers (Wilsworth, 1970)� Early in
July 1970, a British Army raid in the Lower Falls district of Belfast sparked a riot
and gun battles between soldiers and the
Official IRA� Following this escalation of
violence, the British Army imposed a 36hour curfew and raided hundreds of homes
after gassing the neighborhood with CS
gas (Campbell & Connelly, 2003)� Scholars have found the Falls Curfew created a
negative backlash effect, where the British Army’s actions may have contributed
to IRA recruitment (Duffy, 2009; LaFree,
Dugan, & Korte, 2009)�
It took until February 1971 for Lord
Carrington, then Secretary of State for
Defense, to acknowledge that “the recent
riots represented a new phase in the campaign of violence� The disorder was no

longer a merely intercommunal matter;
and a situation approaching armed conf lict was developing” (PRO, 1971)� At this
point, British policy shifted towards to
“eliminating the hard core of terrorists”
(Hansard, 1971a)� However, the security forces’ campaign was always meant to
be limited, and the British forces rejected the notion that any means would have
justified the defeat of the IRA (“Progress
in Ulster,” 1971)� In line with this tentativeness, London attempted to accelerate
the “swift exit” of British forces through
heavy reliance on the locally-recruited
UDR (Hansard, 1971b)� London also devolved considerable decision-making authority to the Army; for example, London
declared legality as the only guideline in
relation to the level of force, which was
vague and never translated into simple operating procedures (Neumann, 2003)�
On August 9th, 1971, anger bubbled over
when the British Army introduced internment� At dawn, armed soldiers launched
raids and arrested 342 people suspected of
involvement with the IRA, most of whom
who had no links to the Republican paramilitaries (Spjut, 1986)� This precipitated
four days of violence in which twenty-four
people died, and internment marked the
complete alienation of the Catholic community from the existing structures of
government (Neumann, 2003)� In turn,
this allowed the IRA to ratchet up its
military campaign; in the six months prior to internment, there were twenty-five
deaths, but the following six months saw
185 deaths (Hansard, 1972)� Internment
demonstrated that British reliance on
purely repressive means of addressing the
situation were counterproductive� Around
this time, the failure of London’s political
strategy became apparent as well� After
British soldiers shot dead two Catholic civilians in Free Derry in July 1971, riots
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Northern Irish girl watches member of
paramilitary (Belfast Forum, 2011)�

erupted in the city, and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) – the major Nationalist political party – protested
by withdrawing from the Parliament of
Northern Ireland in Stormont (Bell, 1993)�
The conflict continued to escalate into
1972, when, on January 30th, the British
army shot twenty-six unarmed civilians,
thirteen of whom were killed, during an
anti-internment demonstration in Derry
(Conway, 2003)� The event became known
as “Bloody Sunday” and was the highest
death toll from a single shooting incident
during the conf lict in Northern Ireland�
Subsequent violence, namely during the
funerals of eleven of those killed on Bloody
Sunday and the detonation of multiple car
bombs throughout February and March,
gradually led the British government realize that the IRA could not be defeated militarily (Neumann, 2003)� Harry Tuzo, the
commanding officer of the British Army
in Northern Ireland at the time, described
the IRA’s military campaign as “an activity that could be carried on until they
choose to desist finally from what they are
doing” (quoted in Kelly, 1976)� This meant
that defeating the IRA as a precondition
for political progress was no longer viable, and Reginald Maudling, then Home
Secretary of the British government, came
to view the military as a tool for bring-

ing about “an acceptable level of violence”
(Chartes, 1971)� Around the same time,
London began to reconsider the viability of home rule, or devolving powers to a
Northern Irish legislative body� Maudling
began to advocate openly for power-sharing in which minority representation was
guaranteed as early as March 1972 (PRO,
1972a)� However, this memorandum was
met with mixed reception by the Cabinet, and on March 30th, 1972, the British
government dissolved Northern Ireland’s
Government and Parliament, instituting
direct rule from Westminster and taking
over the governance of the province (Neumann, 2003)�
These early years of 1969-72 exemplify
three major themes of this case study as it
relates to the correlation between state capacity and duration/intensity of conf lict�
First, the early years of the Troubles indicated that strong states like the United
Kingdom may underestimate the severity
of civil unrest in peripheral regions� Naturally, in London, the state’s monopoly
on the legitimate use of force was taken
for granted, but in Northern Ireland, no
wide consensus existed about the role or
responsibility of the security forces (Neumann, 2003)� To put a finer point on it, in
Northern Ireland, members of the community were actively resisting the execution
of state authority� By this time, London
was well-accustomed to its subjects rejecting British authority, given its recent experience with the decommissioning of its
colonial empire, but for Northern Ireland
citizens – who were represented in Parliament, were equal under British law, and
could participate via normal channels of
government – to resort to such violence
was unthinkable to Westminster� Even
when entering the conf lict, the British
government did not seem to grasp the
severity of the grievances and the deeply
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divided nature of the society: the principal objective of the intervention in August 1969 was simply, as Home Secretary
Callaghan put it, not “to get sucked into
the Irish bog” (Callaghan, 1973, p� 15)� Indeed the British Army would fail in this
endeavor, as twenty-six long years of conf lict awaited it in ‘the Irish bog�’
Second, the case of the Troubles indicates that strong states may fail to strike
a balance on what constitutes an appropriate use of military force in responding to
internal conf lict – either being too timid
or too repressive� The British Army oscillated between these two extremes over
the first three years of the Troubles: on
the one hand, the security forces were unwilling to take extreme military action to
eliminate terrorists altogether, which lead
to the establishment of “no go” areas where
the IRA was free to organize� On the other hand, the British Army swung too far
in the other direction with internment,
which may have increased the duration of
the conf lict, as it handed proverbial ammunition to IRA for use in its recruitment
campaigns� London learned through the
internment that solely repressive ways of
ending the conf lict would fail� This lead to
the third major theme exemplified by this
case study: the idea that strong states may
attempt other solutions, such as economic or political reforms, in the absence of
a definitive military strategy� The British
government tried many political reforms,
such as altering laws regarding discrimination towards the minority community
and changing the composition of the police force� It also attempted economic solutions through providing employment to
Northern Irish citizens (Neumann, 2003)�
While these solutions may have eventually
contributed to the solution of the conf lict
many years later, it is arguable that the
oscillation between military and political/

economic solutions lengthened the conf lict� London’s vast array of policy options
may have been an embarrassment of riches, and in this way, the number of resources possessed by strong states might cause
indecision on the part of policymakers�
Perhaps if London chose to respond with
more military resoluteness or prevented
IRA activity in the early years, the Troubles may have ended sooner�
1972 – 1975
The British government initially regarded the abolition of the Northern Irish
Parliament in Stormont as a temporary
measure (Neumann, 2003)� It retained
not only its vision of Northern Ireland as
‘a place apart’ but also its desire to insulate the British mainland from political
conf lict in the province� To achieve these
ends, the British government gradually
came to appreciate devolution as the best
arrangement, but self-government had to
be supplemented by a cross-community
coalition to mitigate sectarian divisions�
This would eventually lead to signing of
the Sunningdale Agreement in late 1973,
but prior to that, beginning in 1972, Britain began to recognize that its political
and military aims were crucially intertwined (Neumann, 2003)�
In the early stages of direct rule, Britain struggled to balance the competing
imperatives placed on its military� Dual
mandates existed for the British Army,
including stopping paramilitary activity while simultaneously “regaining the
trust” of the minority Catholic community
(Neumann, 2003)� As Lord Windlesham,
a Minister of State under Home Secretary
William Whitelaw, explained it, London’s
policy at this time contained twin objectives: “British policy rests on the security
forces in Northern Ireland countering effectively and impartially, the use of force
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… by extremists of whatever kind� At
the same time, the government is working towards a new form of administration
in Northern Ireland” (“Ulster beyond,”
1972)� Another concern of the British government emanated from its commitment
to political and constitutional solutions: to
this end, a lower level of violence was beneficial (Edwards, 2020)� These conflicting
objectives led to the scaling down of security forces in Catholic areas, and this failure to maintain military pressure on the
IRA allowed them “to regroup and extend
their inf luence” (Dewar, 1985, p� 64)� It
also resulted in the rise of Loyalist paramilitary activity, since the lax policing of
Catholic communities raised Unionist suspicions about the commitment of the British forces to neutrality (Edwards, 2010)�
In late May 1972, the IRA exploded
twenty-two bombs in Belfast in what became known as “Bloody Friday�” In response, two months later, on July 31st,
the British Army launched Operation Motorman, in which they deployed 12,000
soldiers to re-take the “no-go areas” the
IRA had been using for recruitment and
operations (Sanders, 2013)� Motorman was
a limited military operation in the sense
that it demonstrated overwhelming military strength in combination with explicit
warnings about the character and timing
of the operation� As such, it was done “to
encourage the more responsible elements
to keep the streets clear” (PRO, 1972b)�
Scholars credit the Motorman operation
for its benefit to British intelligence, which
contributed to a reduction of paramilitary
activity: in the three weeks before Motorman, there were 2,595 shooting incidents
across Northern Ireland, but in the three
weeks after, only 380 shooting incidents
occurred (Smith, 2002)� In addition, Motorman strengthened the SDLP’s resolve
to participate in constitutional politics,

which paved the way for the signature of
the Sunningdale Agreement in December
1973 (Smith & Neumann, 2005)�
The Sunningdale Agreement attempted to establish a power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive and a cross-border
Council of Ireland� However, in its construction of the power-sharing agreement,
Westminster assumed that Unionists
cared much more about devolution and
home rule, when they really were concerned with constitutional stability that
would prevent a united Ireland (Neumann,
2003)� Unionists began to feel that “new
Stormont” would cause Britain to sell out
Northern Ireland� Declarations from the
Home Secretary Maudling that “[i]f, by
agreement, the North and South should at
some time to come together in a United
Ireland … not only would we not obstruct
that solution, but … the whole British
people would warmly welcome it” surely
didn’t help matters (quoted in Rees, 1985,
p� 277)� Structural imbalances towards the
Nationalists and continuing violence contributed to this feeling of unease, and over
the next months, Unionist opposition, violence, and a loyalist general strike cased
the collapse of the Northern Ireland Executive in May 1974 (O’Leary & McGarry, 1996)� After this, Britain re-introduced
direct rule�
Despite the failure of Sunningdale,
Neumann (2003) argues that the British
government still did not understand that
power-sharing would work only if the majority was assured of Northern Ireland’s
constitutional status (p� 97)� Failing to
grasp the true source of Loyalist discontent, London developed a new strategy of
“Ulster nationalism�” A major component
of Ulster nationalism involved changes
to British military strategy described as
“Normalization,” which consisted of two
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major components: policy primacy and
“Criminalization” (O’Leary, 1989)� Police
primacy aimed for the indigenous police
force, the RUC, to take over all law enforcement, while Criminalization abolished the use of detention and assignment
of Special Category status to paramilitary
prisoners (Campbell & Connolly, 2003)�
Contrary to its first impression, Normalization did not in fact have the purpose of
a “swift exit” but rather was aimed at making the engagement more sustainable for
the British forces in the long term (Kennedy-Pipe, 2014)� The British government,
it appeared, was in it for the long haul�
However, Neumann (2003) argues that the
introduction of Normalization in 1974-75
represented “a missed opportunity to defeat the IRA by military means” (p� 83)�
Public outcry after the Birmingham pub
bombings, where twenty-one English civilians were killed in November 1974, and
severe damage to IRA military capabilities from Operation Motorman may have
allowed the British Army to strike a fatal
blow against the IRA (Neumann, 2003)�
However, preferring to focus on political
and constitutional solutions, the British
government diverted its energies to the
implementation of Normalization (Hansard, 1975)�
In late 1974 and early December 1975,
the IRA agreed to a truce and ceasefire

Belfast IRA man on patrol
(Belfast Telegraph, 1987)�

with the British government and Northern
Ireland Office� The British government
agreed to the ceasefire, eager to convert
these “men of violence” to peaceful means
and encourage all parties to commit to a
settlement (Dixon, 2001)� Incident centers
were established to monitor the ceasefire,
and the establishment of these centers was
also seen as additional encouragement for
Republicans to enter the political process
(Dixon, 2008)� O’Brien (1999) notes that
the British government sponsored what
would soon become Sinn Fein’s first offices and even offered to help with public
relations if the Republicans would participate in the elec¬¬tions� Despite all
of London’s efforts, it soon became clear
that the Republicans would not go political (McKittrick & McVea, 2002)� Just as
Westminster failed to appreciate the importance of constitutional stability to the
Unionists, it overestimated the degree of
compromise Republicans would be willing
to make on their ultimate goal of a united
Ireland (Neumann, 2003)� The first major
breach of the February truce occurred in
July 1975, when four British soldiers were
killed by an IRA bomb near Forkill, and
the violence re-escalated shortly thereafter, with six more major attacks occurring
before November (Kelley, 1982)�
This period of the Troubles came to an
end on December 5, 1975, when the British Army ended the policy of internment
in accordance with its new Normalization
policy (Spjut, 1986)� In that time, 1,981
people were interned, and the interrogation techniques used on internees have
been described by the European Commission on Human Rights in 1976 as torture
(Sanders, 2012)� 1975 drew to a close with
many Unionists viewing the introduction
of Normalization with unease: Neumann
(2003) contends that, in practice, the introduction of the policy – with its reduc-
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tion of British troops, release of detainees,
and sustaining of the IRA ceasefire – indicated to many observers the beginning
of a British withdrawal� The sharp deviation from previous military strategy led to
political instability in the late 1970s and
early 1980s�
The period of 1972-75 saw similar
trends in the inf luence of the British government’s considerable state capacity on
the duration and intensity of the internal
conf lict� First, the British government
continued to misunderstand aspects of the
conf lict due to its location in a peripheral province� Specifically, London did not
understand Unionist desires, thinking
them to prize devolution more highly over
a stable constitutional order that would
guarantee Northern Ireland’s place in the
United Kingdom� Moreover, its lack of understanding of local politics manifested
itself in Normalization, which devolved
power to local police forces like the UDR
and RUC, which were viewed as partisan
in the conf lict� Neumann (2003) argues
that the British government undermined
itself in this decision and notes that there
was “little understanding amongst British
ministers that, in a deeply divided society,
the acceptance of law-enforcement was
bound to be perceived in sectarian terms,
and that impartiality was determined by
the local security forces’ communal composition as much as by their objective professionalism” (p� 182)� Arguably, the shift
in reliance to local security forces, most of
whom were Protestant, may have caused
the conf lict to endure longer�
Second, as before, the military policy of Britain was fraught with internal
contradictions during this period� Dual
mandates of “regaining the trust” of the
Catholic community and fighting the
paramilitaries led to a scaling down of the

use of security forces in Catholic areas,
which allowed the IRA to regroup� This,
too, may have lengthened the conf lict and
serves as another example of a strong
state struggling to strike a good balance
with its use of military force� The British
government seemed to reach that happy
medium in Operation Motorman, which
was applauded by scholars for its effectiveness despite its limited scope� Both Motorman and its warning of civilians before
its implementation exemplify how strong
states may experience internal conf lict of
a lower intensity; states with high capacity
may be able to protect civilians and their
own troops when employed in military operations� And while some scholars believe
the IRA could have been defeated altogether in the mid-1970s, this is certainly up for debate� Instead of striking down
more heavily against the IRA during this
time, the British government focused on
the third theme of strong states – political, economic, and constitutional solutions, like Sunningdale, Criminalization,
and inducements for Republicans to participate in the political process� Although
each of these policies would fail in turn,
the British reliance on them illustrates
how strong states may prefer to use other
tools in their toolboxes in lieu of military
force, thus decreasing the intensity of civil
war – and possibly lengthening it�
1976 – 1982
This period was characterized by the
longest continued period of undiminished
British direct rule� Going into 1976, the
British government decided that no new
constitutional initiatives would be pursued
before a stable constitutional, political,
military, and economic order was established (Neumann, 2003)� While devolution
and power-sharing continued to be the
primary British objective, its actualization
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was believed to lie in the long term� In
the meantime, direct rule would have to
suffice� Throughout this period, violence
dropped by nearly 75% from 1976 to 1978,
and while scattered attacks still occurred,
this period of the Troubles was considerably less intense that its predecessors
(Neumann, 2003)�
Because direct rule had been adopted
on a basically permanent basis, cooperation between London and the Republic
of Ireland had broken down (Ceallaigh,
1996)� Desiring the eventual unification
of the island of Ireland, the Irish government in Dublin wanted the British
government to recommit to a regime of
devolution and power-sharing that would
incorporate cross-border cooperation between the Republic and Northern Ireland
(Neumann, 2003)� Thankfully for Dublin,
its credibility with the Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland allowed it pressure London by undermining Britain’s
military and political strategies� Later
in this period, Westminster expressed it
was essential that “Irish Prime Minister
Charles Haughey should not support” the
hunger strikes of Republican prisoners in
1980 and 1981 (Emery, 1980)� Moreover,
the land border between the Republic and
Northern Ireland gave Dublin bargaining
power� Callaghan, elected Prime Minister
of the UK in April 1976, accused Dublin
of not taking seriously “the vital need for
close border cooperation if the IRA threat
was to be contained” (Callaghan, 1987, p�
499)� Later, after Margaret Thatcher unseated the Labour majority in 1979, she
too echoed the sentiment that “the border
… is of crucial significance to the security problem” (Thatcher, 1995, p� 385)� It
became clear that the Republic of Ireland
was a crucial partner in resolving the
Troubles, one whose preferences would
have to be accommodated�

Although the British government noted the importance of the shared Irish border, it began to take the position of Dublin
more seriously after August 1979, when
the IRA assassinated Lord Mountbatten
in the Republic of Ireland and killed 18
British soldiers in Warrenpoint� This was
a turning point for the new Thatcher Cabinet that underscored the importance of
cooperation on border security (Thatcher,
1995)� Shortly thereafter, the Secretary
of State for Northern Ireland, Humphrey
Atkins, invited members of both governments to participate in a Constitutional Conference in 1980� This conference,
along with a series of inter-governmental
meetings between 1976 and 1981, failed
to achieve any significant change in British strategy, but finally, in 1981, London
threw its weight behind another constitutional initiative aimed at an internal settlement and devolution (Joyce & Murtagh,
1983)� But by this point, neither the Irish
government nor the SDLP were appeased,
both of which were frightened by the immense degree of Catholic support for the
ongoing prison hunger strikes and the
potential growth of Sinn Fein as a viable
electoral force (Neumann, 2003)�
These hunger strikes of 1980 and 1981
were prompted by the withdrawal of Special Category status� Special Category had
existed since 1972 and allowed paramilitary prisoners to claim they were “political
prisoners�” Its removal was tantamount to
claiming there was no difference between
“convicted terrorists” and “run-of-themill criminals” (Neumann, 2003, p� 110)�
Thatcher defended the withdrawal of the
status by confirming, “There is no such
thing as political murder, political bombing, or political violence� There is only
criminal murder, criminal bombing, and
criminal violence” (“Mrs� Thatcher pledges no sellout,” 1981)� What really was at
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stake was Britain’s policy of Normalization� The second of the hunger strikes,
occurring in 1981, saw ten Republican
prisoners die in the Maze prison, including the notable Bobby Sands, who had won
a by-election to be elected as a Member
of Parliament at Westminster (English,
2005)� After his death on hunger strike, his
election agent, Owen Carron, held his seat
after an increased vote (English, 2005)�
International media coverage brought
attention to the hunger strike and the Republican movement, causing the popularity of the hunger strikers to surge in the
Catholic community (White, 1993)� London could not understand the support for
the hunger strikers, given that Criminalization led them to believe that those in
the jails were criminals on the fringes of
society (Neumann, 2003)� The British government failed to grasp that even anti-Republican Catholics, like Mairead Corrigan,
noted peace-maker, saw them “as men from
our community� We know how they have
come to be there� And above all we don’t
want them suffering within the prisons”
(quoted in O’Malley, 1997)� As a result,
what had previously been a fringe element
of Northern Irish politics then emerged as
a potent electoral force: Sinn Fein, widely regarded the political wing of the IRA
(Taylor, 2014)� In 1982, another Northern
Ireland Assembly was established at Stormont, but its attempt to “win back support
for moderates” backfired when the SDLP
decided not to take its seats, allowing
Sinn Fein to gain five seats, even narrowly
missing two more seats in Belfast North
and Fermanagh (Neumann, 2003)�
This dawn of Sinn Fein as a credible
electoral force meant that constitutional
Nationalists like the SDLP experienced
difficulties in staying moderate (Taylor,
2014)� As time went on, even the SDLP

began to advocate strongly for British cooperation with Dublin� Their pivot, partly caused by electoral pressure caused by
Sinn Fein, evidenced that direct rule from
London was untenable for the minority
and that Britain was no longer viewed as
an impartial and honest broker (Neumann,
2003)� SDLP eventually withdrew from
the by-election for the seat of Fermanagh
and South Tyrone to show support for
Bobby Sands, a move London found inconceivable (Taylor, 2014)� More importantly,
though, Bobby Sands’ victory, as well as
Sinn Fein’s relative success in the Assembly elections, refuted the idea that “men of
violence” or supporters of the IRA were
on the fringes of society, although a clear
majority of Catholic still supported constitutional Nationalists like the SDLP� This
clear refutation of British belief in the
moderate middle contributed to a gradual growth of British distrust of the local
political process� The Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland, Roy Mason, once set
up a local economic council, and in so doing, he made it explicit that no politicians
should be included: “If, in this province,
you decide to bring politicians on … then
your economic council, first of all, will be
very quickly bloated; and secondly, I don’t
want political squabbles to spill over”
(“Roy Mason on the economic prospects,”
1977)� In the absence of more permanent
solutions, British politicians decided to
wait it out until “existing leaders [were]
replaced by abler successors more willing
to reach a compromise across sectarian
barriers” (Walker, 1977)� Until then, direct rule would continue�
As all these political developments were
unfolding, the military’s counterinsurgency campaign in Northern Ireland remained
limited� Citing familiar reasons, Mason
declared, “A democracy functions by the
will of the people and through the rule of
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law� It cannot behave like a totalitarian
state, nor is it right that it should” (Hansard, 1977a)� Similarly, the British government still perceived that “tough” security
measures would drive IRA recruitment by
alienating moderate Catholics (Hansard,
1977b)� The British Army’s activity also
did not escalate due to the assumptions of
Normalization, the overarching policy at
the time – namely that the gradual return
to local law enforcement would make the
situation more stable (Neumann, 2003)�
However, Normalization failed to achieve
its promise of completely stabilizing the
situation for a few reasons� First, the RUC,
the local authority to which the British
Army was gradually ceding its responsibilities, was still essentially exclusively
Protestant, which caused law enforcement
to be regarded as a tool in the Catholic-Protestant power struggle (Brown &
MacGinty, 2003)� Moreover, government
rhetoric about adherence to “law and order” failed to convince observers, given
the Army’s heavy reliance on uncorroborated evidence, extended holding powers,
and non-jury courts (Neumann, 2003)�
While they may have been strictly speaking “successful,” many of the operations
that were carried out by the Army did not
align with the British ideal of civilian policing (Weitzer, 1995)�
Neumann (2003) argues that British
policy during these years of 1976-82 made
assumptions of “an almost ideal game situation, that is, one in which London was
the only actor to determine the strategic
environment” (p� 121)� In reality, countless
players and factors – including the government of the Republic of Ireland, a global recession, hunger strikers, Sinn Fein,
and the IRA’s indefatigable disruption
– all frustrated London’s attempts to implement strategy� The consequences of the
second hunger strike in 1981, along with

disadvantageous outcomes in the Assembly in 1982, forced Westminster to return
to the drawing board once again�
As before, British policy during 197682 ref lected the governments’ lack of understanding of the forces at its periphery�
The British government could not grasp
that even those who desired peace still
saw hunger strikers as men from their
communities, and its resoluteness on the
revocation of Special Category status led
to international and domestic sympathy
for the hunger strikers� This in turn led
to the rise of Sinn Fein, which pulled constitutional Nationalists in their direction
as they battled for electoral power� Strong
states, like the UK in the case of Northern
Ireland, may underestimate actors or miscalculate decisions made in regions they
do not view as vital, which may contribute
to conf lict duration� In addition, strong
states might downplay military solutions
in favor of political solutions� By this time,
the British government settled into a fairly stable pattern of limited counterinsurgency, believing that tough security measures would drive IRA recruitment� The
military gradually became viewed as a
tool by which a political settlement could
be reached� As Neumann (2003) notes,
“[The norm of minimum force] reinforced
London’s conviction that there could be
no ‘military solution,’ and that it was the
security forces’ task to buy time for a political settlement in achieving an acceptable level of violence … in that sense, it
was the British government rather than
the IRA, which had first embarked on a
‘long war’” (p� 181)� While this long war
dragged on, London sought an accommodation with Dublin and downplayed local
politics� During these years, deaths were
among the lowest of all of the years of the
conf lict, indicating that a state’s reliance
on solutions beyond military force may

46
contribute to lower deaths, which may be
in some way connected to state capacity�
1982 – 1988
The most significant event of the 198288 period was the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985� Constraints
and pressures had arisen from the direct
rule experiment of 1976-82, and London
came to believe Westminster governing
the province would contribute little to the
containment of the conf lict, nor was there
any realistic prospect of power-sharing at
the time� Therefore, the only way to prevent the conf lict from spiraling into the
mainland was to seek an accommodation
with Dublin, making direct rule logistically easier for the British government�
Seeking to reduce the violence while negotiations between the Irish and British
governments were underway, the British
Army’s main goal was to gain efficiency at
containing paramilitary activity, particularly through improvements in cross-border security cooperation� Despite her
reputation as “Iron Lady,” in Northern
Ireland, the Thatcher period was not associated with an increased use of military
force, given that the existing political
and constitutional objectives limited the
military objectives that could be pursued
(Thatcher, 1995)� Indeed, the Home Secretary of Thatcher’s Cabinet, Douglas Hurd,
deemed the three most popular options for
escalating the use of force – internment,
shoot-to-kill, and cross-border hot pursuit
– as counterproductive and inadvisable
(Neumann, 2003)�
With that said, two new experiments
in military strategy did emerge in these
years: the systematic use of accomplice evidence, and shoot-to-kill (Hansard, 1984)�
First, the British Army began to rely heavily on intelligence from arrested members
of the paramilitaries who divulged the

identities of fellow paramilitary members
(informants who became known as “supergrass”)� The supergrass system was credited by 1983 as having ‘broken up the Ulster Volunteer Force command structure
in Belfast and virtually eliminated the
IRA in Northern Belfast” (Moloney, 1983)�
Second, on a few occasions, the security
forces drastically exceeded the appropriate level of force; one particularly notable
incident occurred in which six unarmed
Catholic men were shot dead by a RUC
undercover unit (Neumann, 2003)� While
no one in London wanted to make what
became known as “shoot to kill” as official
government policy, members of the government harbored a certain sympathy for
the security forces, who had been thrust
in a situation where “they were expected
to play by rules which the IRA would have
never dreamt about” (Neumann, 2003, p�
131)� Despite the government’s sympathy
for the difficulty of the Army’s position,
though, shoot-to-kill did not make its way
into official military policy�
In the absence of consequential shifts
in British counterterrorism policy, Irish
cross-border cooperation emerged as
the primary security concern at the time
(Thatcher, 1995)� Several notable attacks
occurred to spur this shift, such as the Harrods bombing in December 1983, where
an IRA car bomb outside a department
store in London killed six people, and the
Brighton hotel bombing in October 1984,
where five people died in a bomb attack
on the site of Conservative Party conference (Buchan, 2011)� These events underscored the fact the Northern Ireland conf lict would spiral into the mainland, if left
unchecked� Accordingly, London sought
to make the Irish government a responsible stakeholder in the management of the
situation in Northern Ireland� On the Irish
side, Garret FitzGerald, then the Taoise-
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The 1985 signature of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (BBC News, 2014)�

ach (Ireland’s prime minister equivalent),
believed that the only way to resolve the
conf lict was “to act urgently and resolutely together on the political front” to find
a new constitutional solution (Havilland,
1983)�
However, the British government did
not want the Irish government to have any
real authority� As Christopher Mallaby,
the coordinator of Anglo-Irish relations in
the Cabinet, explained to Neumann (2003),
“Any situation where the British government would require the Irish government’s agreement to any action or policy
would [have been] unacceptable” (p� 125)�
Gradually, British constitutional strategy
during this time shifted to a negotiation of
a balanced inter-governmental framework
that granted Dublin a “legitimate interest” but “no real powers” in the affairs of
Northern Ireland (Neumann, 2003)� British political strategy in Northern Ireland
accordingly shifted during 1982-88, favoring to sideline the local political parties
while focusing on an inter-governmental

agreement� The mid-1986 collapse of the
recently-reinstated Northern Ireland Assembly exemplified the British government’s abandonment of devolution at this
time� This new focus on the Irish dimension culminated in the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) by Thatcher
and FitzGerald on November 15, 1985
(Kenny & Kenny, 1986)�
The AIA established the Anglo-Irish
Intergovernmental Conference, which
would be made up of officials from the
British and Irish governments� The body
sought to promote “cross-border cooperation” and had a consultative role only –
that is, it had no power to make decisions
or change laws (Cochrane, 1997)� The UK
also agreed that all British Army patrols
in Northern Ireland would have a civilian
RUC escort (Cox, 1987)� Finally, the treaty
confirmed that there would be no change
in the constitutional position of Northern Ireland unless a majority of its people
consented to a united Ireland (O’Leary,
1987)� For the Irish government, the AIA
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supported and strengthened Constitutional Nationalism in the wake of fears of a
nascent and radical Sinn Fein; it also perceived the AIA as indirectly providing an
incentive for Unionists to agree to power-sharing (Neumann, 2003; FTN 68)�
The improved cooperation between the
British and Irish government would later become key in the passage of the Good
Friday Agreement thirteen years later
(Ruane & Todd, 2003)�
However, the AIA failed to improve
cross-border security cooperation; the minority also became no more inclined to
support the Northern Irish institutions,
and Dublin’s public criticism of Britain
intensified (Neumann, 2003)� In addition, the accord was strongly rejected
by Unionists (Cox, 1987)� In response to
strong Unionist opposition, Thatcher responded that “the people of Northern Ireland can get rid of the inter-governmental
conference by agreeing to devolved government” (O’Leary & McGarry, 1996, p�
234)� Despite this opposition, the AIA is
credited with several political results: it
did cause the Unionists to re-engage politically, and the AIA also contributed
to the marginalization of Republicans,
leading to a perception in the Republican
camp of political and military stalemate�
This forced the leadership to review the
assumptions on which its strategies were
based, and the 1988 broadcasting ban of
twelve organizations, including Sinn Fein,
also contributed a Republican sense of
marginalization (“Whose oxygen,” 1988)�
All of these changes contributed to the
parties’ increased willingness to come to
the bargaining table in the 1990s, when
the Troubles drew to a shaky close�
This penultimate period from 1982-88
saw a refinement of British strategy, as
evidenced by the conf lict’s later resolution

through similar tactics� To this end, Britain
began to understand the desires and fears
of the players in its peripheral province,
and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, while unpopular domestically, did cause local political parties to revisit their intransigence�
As before, the British government chose to
downplay the military element in favor of
political strategies – the major goal of the
military during this period was to contain
paramilitary activity and become more efficient at this task� The British Army saw
a slight hiccup in its gradual calibration
of ‘appropriate use of force’ when several
shoot-to-kill incidents occurred, but overall, in this case, a strong state chose to
sideline military solutions for political or
economic solutions� Namely, the British focus on obtaining an accommodation from
Dublin and its use of intelligence through
the supergrass structure both represented
the state’s attempts to fight the war using
less violent techniques� Arguably, strategies like these may have taken longer to
work, lengthening the conf lict’s duration,
but they most likely resulted in the deaths
of fewer people, lowering its intensity� As
in previous years, the period of 1982-88
illustrated several major themes in how
strong states choose to respond to civil
wars�
1989 – 1998
The successful conclusion of the Belfast
Agreement in 1998 represents the greatest achievement of British policy in Northern Ireland and the end of the Troubles
in Northern Ireland� In marked contrast
to the AIA, British policy shifted towards
the promotion of an agreed settlement,
and because there was no point imposing
changes to the constitutional position of
Northern Ireland (because either party
would find it unacceptable), Britain was
prepared to accept any outcome as long
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as it had achieved sufficient agreement between the local parties� London began to
refer to itself simply as “partisan for progress” (Neumann, 2003, p� 149)�
At the beginning of this period, having
achieved cooperation with the Republic
of Ireland through the AIA, the British
government returned to its traditional objective of facilitating agreement on devolution and a limited Irish dimension� To
achieve this, it launched negotiations for
a settlement amongst the various parties,
focusing on the principle of consent and
the integrity of the political process� However, a major question emerged of whether
or not to include Sinn Fein in this political process� Earlier on, London’s aim of
political stability meant that there was no
point in including Sinn Fein if it destroyed
the likelihood of securing a settlement
(Major, 2013)� However, if the IRA ended
its campaign of violence, talks with Sinn
Fein might become possible and make the
peace more stable (McKittrick & Brown,
1989)� London also knew that there was a
perceived political and military stalemate
in the Republican community at this time
and took steps to maintain this perception�
The military strategy shifted at this
time as well� The British Army remained
involved only to the extent that it served
as a tool to support the political process
and maintain the Republican perception of
military stalemate (Neumann, 2003)� The
then-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, made it clear that the
military presence was “made necessary by
violence, [would] be maintained as long as
there [was] violence, but [would] certainly be reduced when violence [came] to an
end” (Hennessy, 2000, p� 68)� In addition,
the formulation of Westminster’s military strategy was guided, as it often was
throughout the conf lict, by its aforemen-

tioned political objectives� London’s goal
of a devolved government on the basis of
an agreed settlement necessitated a ceasefire from the IRA, which would allow Republicans to participate in the settlement
(Hollywood, 1997)�
Although paramilitary activity on the
British mainland intensified in 1994 and
1995, the British government seemed convinced this rise in paramilitary activity
represented the beginnings of a peace settlement: as John Major (2013), the Prime
Minister of the UK at the time, described,
“[A]n offer of peace needed to be accompanied by violence, to show their volunteers that they were not surrendering” (p�
433)� In order to trigger a permanent IRA
ceasefire that would enable Sinn Fein to
participate in political talks, the leaders of
the SDLP and Sinn Fein produced several
drafts of a declaration of principles which
would be announced by the British and
Irish prime ministers� The final draft of
their document referred to the collective
right of the “Irish people” to self-determination and overturned the idea of consent
by stating consent had to be achieved “over
a period” wherein the two governments
would legislate for Irish unity, regardless
of opinion in Northern Ireland (Mallie
& McKittrick, 1997)� Had they been announced, these principles obviously would
have triggered an end to the IRA’s military
campaign, since it negated the principle of
consent, abdicated the need for agreement
from both sides, and rejected Westminster
as a neutral arbiter (Major, 2013)� Naturally, the British government thought that
this document would have torched the political process, as the majority would have
viewed it as selling out Northern Ireland’s
place in the United Kingdom (Neumann,
2003)�
After several months of bilateral nego-
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tiations, the Joint Declaration for Peace
(also known as the Downing Street Declaration, or DSD) was announced on December 15th, 1993, by the British Prime Minister Major and the Irish Prime Minister,
Albert Reynolds� It nominally resembled
the draft written by the SDLP and Sinn
Fein leaders, but its content was fundamentally different from the proposals of
the original draft (Mallie & McKittrick,
1997)� In fact, many thought it to represent
the exact opposite: the DSD restored the
constitutional status quo by stating that
self-determination had to be exercised on
the basis of consent and gave no timeline
for a united Ireland (Cox, 1996)� Neumann
(2003) refers to the DSD as a “tactical
masterstroke” that united the whole spectrum of constitutional Nationalism, along
with the biggest Unionist party, behind its
agenda of devolved government and the
principle of consent (p� 152)�
Shortly thereafter, on August 31st,
1994, the IRA issued a statement announcing the complete cessation of military activities� Throughout this ceasefire, the
IRA machine was far from inactive; to the
contrary, targeting, training, and acquisition continued as normal during this time
(Sharrock, 1995)� The Combined Loyalist
Military Command followed suit not soon
after, on October 13th, 1994, when they issued a statement announcing a ceasefire on
behalf of all loyalist paramilitaries (McAuley, 2005)� The temporary cessation of
hostilities allowed a Sinn Fein delegation
to meet with officials from the Northern
Ireland Office in January 1995� A month
later, the British and Irish governments
released the Joint Framework document
(O’Leary, 1995)� The Joint Framework
document proposed North-South institutions that would be established by an Act
of Parliament; in the event that a future
Northern Ireland assembly would break

down, the responsibilities of these institutions would be transferred to a standing
Inter-Government Conference (O’Leary,
1997)� This Joint Framework was clearly overbalanced towards the Nationalist
position, since the Irish side had made no
new concessions to justify the Joint Declaration’s favoritism towards it� In fact, its
default mechanism was an invitation for
Nationalists to make the Northern Ireland
assembly unworkable, thus torching the
need for any Unionist cooperation (Neumann, 2003)�
Accordingly, the peace talks backtracked in February 1996, when two civilians were killed in the London Docklands
bombing, which represented the end of the
seventeen-month IRA ceasefire (Joyce,
2016)� IRA violence continued for the next
two years, but despite widespread calls for
an all-out security offensive, London resisted the urge to reintroduce internment
(Hibbs, Harnden, & Savill, 1996)� Prior to
this, the reliance on locally recruited security forces had been met with intense
criticism after it was revealed that members of the UDR had passed on sensitive
files to Loyalist paramilitaries (Hansard,
1990)� In the end, fifty-nine UDR officers
were charged, and this event damaged
what little remaining impartiality the security forces were perceived to have� Just
as Britain was beginning to mediate an
agreed settlement, it was extremely important that the military situation not escalate (Neumann, 2003)� The peace talks
continued at Stormont in June 1996 without Sinn Fein� But in May 1997, a general election was held across the UK, and
Sinn Fein increased its share of the vote
to 16%, making it the third largest party in the region, and winning two seats
in Parliament (Taylor, 2014)� Shortly after
the election, the new British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, endorsed the Framework
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Documents and the criteria for inclusion
in all-party talks and signaled his commitment to meet with Sinn Fein to clarify certain issues (Pruitt, 2007)� On June
25th, 1997, the British and Irish governments gave the IRA five weeks to call an
unequivocal ceasefire, and the heat on the
IRA intensified on July 18th, when John
Hume of the SDLP and Gerry Adams of
Sinn Fein called on the IRA to renew its
ceasefire (Pruit, 2007)� The IRA finally
acquiesced on July 19th, announcing the
renewal of its 1994 ceasefire�
With the IRA agreeing to end its violence, this paved the way for Sinn Fein to
sign the Mitchell Principles in September
1997, which was a list of six ground rules
agreed to by the parties in Northern Ireland regarding participation in the talks�
After Sinn Fein’s signature of the Principles, multi-party talks resumed (McKittrick, 1996)� Throughout this final phase
of negotiations, the British government
maintained it was not committed to any
particular outcome and would support any
conclusions resulting from the discussions,
provided sufficient consensus emerged
(Neumann, 2003)� Finally, on April 10th,
1998, the Belfast Agreement (commonly
known as the Good Friday Agreement)
was signed at Stormont�
The Good Friday Agreement consisted
of several components, including devolution, power-sharing, designation, and the
Three Strands� Under the Agreement,
Northern Ireland would have a devolved
government, where the UK parliament
would transfer legislative powers to the
new Northern Ireland Assembly� This
body would in turn devolve executive
powers to the Northern Ireland Executive,
which would consist of both unionists and
nationalists, and special voting arrangements gave veto rights to the minori-

ty community (Cox, Guelke, & Stephen,
2006)� Finally, the three “strands” referred
to three sets of institutions: (1) the democratic institutions of Northern Ireland, described above, (2) the “north-south” institutions created between Northern Ireland
and the Republic of Ireland, and (3) the
“east-west” institutions created between
Ireland and Great Britain� O’Leary (1998)
describes these institutions as making
“Northern Ireland bi-national” and established “elements of co-sovereignty�” While
many commentators have compared the
Agreement to the Sunningdale Agreement
of 1973 (leading one Member of Parliament even to refer to it as “Sunningdale
for slow learners”), scholars note major
issues omitted by Sunningdale that were
addressed by the Good Friday Agreement,
including the principle of self-determination and the recognition of both national
identities (Rasnic, 2003)�
The Good Friday Agreement was set to
be approved by voters across the Ireland
in May 1998� In response, the Loyalist
Volunteer Force declared a ceasefire in the
hopes it would encourage voters to reject
the Good Friday Agreement� But on May
22nd, the referendums were held on the
Belfast Agreement, one in the Republic of
Ireland and the other in Northern Ireland�
They succeeded with 94% and 71% in favor respectively (Cox, Guelke, & Stephen,
2006)� Neumann (2003) argues that the
integration of Sinn Fein into the political
process extracted a high price, since London failed to extract a definitive commitment to decommission arms� Due to spotty disarmament, violence continues to this
day on a small-scale basis� Despite this
continuing unrest, many consider 1998 to
be the end of the Troubles (Aughey, 2005)�
Analysis
The final years of the Troubles, along
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with the entire course of the conf lict, illustrate two key themes regarding the inf luence of state capacity on conf lict duration and intensity: (1) the underestimation
of states of conf licts occurring at their
peripheries, and (2) the subordination of
military strategies to political or economic strategies�
First, the case of the Troubles illustrates
that states – strong and weak alike – may
misunderstand or underestimate conf licts
which occur in peripheral regions� For the
first decade of the civil unrest, the British
government underestimated the severity
of grievances held by participants in the
violence and misinterpreted their political
objectives� As Neumann (2003) contends,
“London’s initial reactions to the street
marches, protests, and civil disturbances in the second half of the 1960s was a
mixture of disbelief, uncertainty, and reluctance … the reforms the Westminster
government pressed for after the violent
clashes of October 1968 were too modest
to have the effect of securing peace” (p� 16)�
The case of Zaire also illustrated this tendency of states to underestimate conf licts
in their peripheries, as its rebellion began
in the eastern provinces, as far from Kinshasa as possible� However, the case of the
First Congo War indicates that it is much
more dangerous for weak states to neglect
the periphery, as they are more susceptible
to toppling quickly when faced with rebellion in far-f lung regions of their country�
Strong states, like the United Kingdom,
might be able to afford to neglect or misunderstand peripheral provinces, since
their intrinsic strength buys them time
to “figure it out�” In this regard, state capacity may be associated with increased
duration of civil wars because the endogenous strength of these states insulates
them from conf lict for longer than in weak
states�

Second, stronger states may equivocate
on the use of military force and choose
to rely on political or economic strategies instead� In continuation with policy
that began in the 1980s, the military was
downplayed during this final period, and
the British Army remained involved in the
province only to the extent it supported
the political process and maintained the
Republicans’ belief in a military stalemate�
Instead, in the 1990s, the British government devoted its energies to facilitating
agreement on devolution and power-sharing, and the Downing Street Declaration,
the Joint Framework, and the Mitchell
Principles all exemplify political strategies that contributed to the resolution
of the war through the acceptance of the
Good Friday Agreement� Strong states,
like the UK, may understand that the use
of overwhelming force could inf lame the
population against them� Weak states may
understand this too, but the key difference
between weak and strong states in this regard is that strong states have alternatives�
Strong states may try to use political, constitutional, or economic tools before reverting to the use of military force, and
these policies may sometimes conf lict or
contradict each other (e�g� 1970s military
strategy as it came to simultaneously winning over the Catholic community while
putting down the IRA)� One possible reason strong states experience longer civil
wars is that it takes them a longer time
to settle on a strategy, given the many
tools and options from which they may
choose� In the case of Northern Ireland,
it took at least fifteen years for the British
government to settle on the combination
of military and political pressures it used
to eventually seek a settlement� This hesitance to use military force from strong
states might also explain my earlier statistical findings of a negative correlation

53
between military expenditures and battle
deaths� Although initially surprising, this
relationship may make more sense in the
context of strong states possessing the
restraint to make sure those military expenditures are used in a way that does not
contribute to rebel recruitment�
Overall, the Troubles of Northern Ireland provide a case in which a strong state
– one of the strongest in the world – experienced a long but less intense internal conf lict� In this instance, the central
government underestimated the severity
of grievances held in one of its peripheral regions, and its lack of familiarity with
the local political situation caused initial
errors and miscalculations of policies� In
addition, the state took time to strike a
balance between military and political instruments of power, eventually favoring
the latter, which may have contributed to
a lower level of intensity but a longer duration� It is worth noting that this intrastate
conf lict had a favorable outcome for the
government� In the case where a state is
strong and it still eventually loses its civil
war, the mechanisms contributing to my
statistical findings of long duration and
low intensity may be dramatically different – perhaps, in these circumstances, the
resources allow governments to hang on
longer, or the state vascillates and errs on
the side of too little or too much military
force� Moreover, it is possible to conceive
of a strong state – perhaps an authoritarian regime like the current one fighting the
Syrian civil war – that does not favor the
British government’s strategy of restraint
and instead uses its military superiority as
its primary strategy� How would we explain the finding of low intensity and long
duration in this instance? At first blush, it
is possible that these circumstances simply
do not occur as often as situations of British restraint do, which may explain the

statistical relationship between low battle
deaths and state capacity� However, if this
is not the case, this opens up a potential
avenue for future research� On that note,
this thesis now concludes with a discussion of the implications of its findings for
policymakers and researchers�

Conclusion & Implications

T

his thesis has shown that state capacity is a statistically significant
predictor of the duration and intensity of civil wars, finding that both military capacity and fiscal capacity are associated with longer but less intense civil
wars� States possessing these capabilities
may face wars in peripheral regions, like
Northern Ireland, in which they underestimate the severity of the threat faced and
experience difficulty projecting power in
the unfamiliar region� These strong states
also possess resources that allow them to
pick their battles, protect their own troops
and civilians, target rebels more effectively, and forestall the rebels’ recruitment
efforts through the reliance on political
solutions and through the provision of aid
and government services� Despite these
apparent strengths, the set of cases examined in this thesis still deals with states
weak enough to allow a civil war to break
out in the first place and with rebels above
the threshold of rebel group viability� The
case of Northern Ireland also indicates
that strong states’ use of non-military
solutions to civil wars may increase their
duration� As a result, these strong states
experience protracted conf licts with fewer
battle deaths per year�
On the other hand, weak states either
must resort to tremendous violence in the
absence of non-military strategies, or, as
in the case of Zaire, they have no credible
military or security presence in the first
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place� Both of these governmental situations contribute to a shorter duration of
civil wars� Weak states are also unable
to protect civilians and control their own
forces, as evidenced by the mass looting
and desertion of Zairian forces, which may
be associated with higher-intensity conf licts� These weak states allow conf licts
in the periphery to blossom into threats
in urban areas as well, as shown by the
AFDL’s quick capture of major cities like
Lubumbashi and Kisangani in the early
months of the First Congo War� Overall,
weak states are less able to achieve their
objectives of maintaining the stability of
their regime and country, leading to short
but bloody conf licts�
This thesis contributes significantly to
the scholarship of civil wars and expands
upon existing discussions described in its
literature review� The proposed definition
of state capacity addresses criticisms that
state capacity is difficult to operationalize while providing a workable framework
within which scholars can continue to address the influence of state strength on
variables of interest� While the literature
regarding the impact of state capacity on
conf lict onset is well-developed, this thesis has made an important contribution by
analyzing how state strength might matter in cases where the state is weak enough
to allow a violent challenge to its authority� State strength, it appears, matters even
after civil wars break out� In addition, this
thesis expands upon existing discussions
within the literature regarding conf lict
duration and intensity� The former body
of scholarship has not fully examined the
relationship between state capacity and
length of civil war, and when it has analyzed the correlation, it often relies on
imperfect proxies of state capacity like
democratization� Through its quantitative
examination of the relationship between

state strength and conf lict duration, this
thesis enters this important variable of
state capacity into the scholarly conversation of the predictors of conf lict duration�
Similarly, the body of literature regarding
conf lict intensity has focused on largely
immutable qualities of the nation-state,
such as oil exportation, rough terrain,
ethnic fractionalization, and democratization, with little attention paid to state
capacity as a potential factor� This thesis
makes a valuable contribution in its argument that the endogenous strength of one
of the most important actors in any civil
war – the state itself – must be considered
in discussions of conf lict intensity�
However, this study is limited in a few
dimensions that open up opportunities for
future research� In the quantitative analyses, chief ly, there are concerns of potential reverse causality in the connection
between military spending and conf lict
intensity; it could be the case that states
that have low military expenditures spend
less on their military due to the low intensity of the conf lict, which would weaken
the assertion that military expenditures
decreases civil war intensity� While lagging the military expenditures variable
does partially solve this problem, it is
worth noting as a possible limitation of
this research� In addition, this study could
be improved by larger amounts of data on
military, fiscal, and bureaucratic capacity,
as the World Development Indicators have
about 360 missing observations, while the
ICRG data only begins in the year 1984�
On the qualitative side, examination of additional case studies would aid scholars’
understanding of the mechanisms linking
state capacity to conf lict duration and intensity� Given their unique and qualitative
nature, claiming generalizability from the
cases of Zaire and Northern Ireland is difficult� In particular, as briefly discussed
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in the conclusion of the Northern Ireland case study, an examination of case in
which strong state does choose to employ
overwhelming military force would contribute greatly to the findings of this thesis� Nevertheless, the two case studies presented in this thesis provide a real-world
illustration of a few of the potential ways
in which state capacity may inf luence conf lict duration and intensity�
Despite their potential limitations, the
findings presented in this thesis have important implications for peacekeepers and
policymakers� Stronger states tend to experience lower intensity conf licts that linger for decades� This could raise a normative question for peacekeepers on whether
they encourage more military spending –
on the one hand, conf licts may become less
bloody, but on the other hand, they may
endure longer� Moreover, stronger states

seem to possess the bureaucratic capability of committing to negotiated settlements and of maintaining the provision of
government services, even in the depths of
civil wars, meaning that peacekeepers may
wish to strengthen state bureaucracies as
a means of decreasing civil war intensity� Another question for further inquiry
would be examine the iterative aspects
of government capacity – how do rebel
groups react to increases in government
capacity, and how much does rebel group
capacity matter for conf lict duration and
intensity? Setting these questions aside
for the future, this thesis is nevertheless
a first step towards understanding how
strong states seek to maintain control of
their populations, how state capacity can
lessen the intensity of conf licts, and how
states can mitigate conditions of anarchy
when civil war breaks out within their
borders, becoming Leviathans once again�
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Figures & Tables

Figure 2� Duration of civil war by outcome�

Figure 3� Duration of civil war with measures of
state capacity held at 75th percentiles
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Figure 5� Histogram of annual battle deaths of the conflicts contained in the
UCDP/PRIO dataset�

Table 2� Impact of military spending on duration of civil war�
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Table 3� Impact of government revenues on duration of civil war�

Table 4� Impact of bureaucratic quality on duration of civil war�
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Table 6� Impact of military expenditures on intensity of civil war�

Table 7� Impact of government revenues on intensity of civil war�
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Table 8� Impact of bureaucratic quality on intensity of civil war�
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